The new U.S. National Security Strategy creates conditions that should encourage Europe to assume greater autonomy, strategic maturity, and developmental focus. The American move away from EU-level federalisation towards supporting stronger national sovereignty provides EU member states with an opportunity to break from the Union’s overregulated, economically damaging, and increasingly militarised policy trajectory. These changes may also enable Slovenia to pursue a more pragmatic and balanced foreign policy — strengthening ties with the United States while re-engaging Eurasian partners in support of long-term stability and national competitiveness.

The new U.S. National Security Strategy for 2025 has triggered a wave of disbelief, criticism, and anxiety across many European political circles. Yet rather than a cause for alarm, this document represents an opportunity for Europe to finally assume responsibility for its own future. The strategy exposes a truth that Europe’s political class has pushed aside for decades: the United States has not always been a benevolent guarantor of European security, but a great power that used Europe as a platform for pursuing its strategic interests vis-à-vis Russia, while Europe itself remained intellectually and politically incapable of developing genuine strategic autonomy.

Contrary to the shocked and dismayed commentary circulating among political analysts, the new U.S. National Security Strategy does not, in my view, represent a negative development for Europe. Quite the opposite. This strategy offers Europe an opportunity — indeed, it compels Europe — to become more autonomous and finally grow up politically. This is an argument I have advanced repeatedly over the years.

Moreover, consistent with many of my previous reflections, I maintain that the American shift away from federalisation under Brussels’ direction toward supporting greater national autonomy and sovereignty is beneficial for Europe from a developmental perspective. Moving away from suffocating, uniform EU policies — policies that suppress competitiveness, innovation, and growth — and strengthening the role of national policymaking provides an opportunity for a renewed developmental acceleration of the EU. As the data clearly show, Europe’s economic progress stalled precisely with the introduction of the Single Market (1993) and the euro (1999). When the EU was “merely” the EEC — a customs union with limited policy coordination and autonomous national development strategies free from paralysing regulation — Europe was a successful region converging with the United States. With deepening integration, however, Europe began to stagnate and has now almost entirely come to a standstill.

Naturally, this new U.S. national security strategy represents a sharp break from the “classical” transatlantic multilateralism on which the EU and Slovenia have built their roles for decades. The core of the document is a hard-edged version of the “America First” doctrine: the United States will drastically narrow its foreign-policy focus to a few core interests while systematically shifting responsibility onto its allies, who are expected to assume “primary responsibility for their regions” and for their own defence — including through a targeted increase in NATO defence spending to 5% of GDP under the new defence commitment. For the EU and for smaller states such as Slovenia, this presents both an opportunity and a shock: an opportunity for those capable of strategically leveraging the space for greater autonomy, and a shock because it disrupts the comfortable assumption that the American security umbrella will automatically address every European problem.

Of particular significance for the EU is that the U.S. document describes Europe as a continent in “civilisational crisis”, threatened by suffocating regulation, migration pressures, restrictions on freedom of expression, low birth rates, and the erosion of national identities. The strategy clearly aligns itself with political forces that advocate a return to “civilisational self-confidence”, the strengthening of national sovereignty, and resistance to supranational institutions. This implies that Washington will be less aligned with the Brussels-driven integration model and more supportive of national-conservative currents within the EU. For the Union as a project of legal, political, and economic integration, this is problematic, as it signals a period in which the United States will actively encourage differentiation among member states — particularly those that are more sovereigntist and pro-American — even at the expense of EU unity. In my view, however, this is not a weakness but an advantage and a developmental opportunity for those countries that remain ambitious.

In the security and defence dimension, the strategy delivers two major signals. The first is that the United States views a rapid end to the war in Ukraine as a core strategic interest — to stabilise the European economy, reduce escalation risks, and restore strategic stability with Russia. This aligns fully with my own assessment, as I see peace as a prerequisite for economic, social, and political stabilisation in Europe. Continuing the war will inevitably fracture the EU, whereas peace — through renewed stability — would safeguard the key achievements of European integration after the Second World War. Yet this new Washington approach places several states in an uncomfortable position, particularly those that became trapped in the logic of the previous U.S. strategy of weakening Russia by expanding NATO toward its borders. In these countries, anti-Russian and militant hysteria has developed to such an extent that “putting the genie back in the bottle” will be extremely difficult without a substantial turnover of political elites.

The second signal is the expectation that Europe assume the long-term burden of its own defence, while the United States remains the strategic coordinator. In practice, this will require a broad political consensus within the EU to substantially increase defence spending, rationalise military capabilities, and seriously debate Europe’s nuclear and industrial strategy — politically sensitive issues, certainly, but also an opportunity to build a militarily sovereign Europe. Only such a Europe can once again act as a global political actor.

On the economic front, the strategy announces a far more assertive approach to trade, industrial policy, and energy. The United States clearly signals an end to the period in which it tolerated large trade surpluses of European allies as long as they served broader geopolitical aims. The new vision is strictly “pro-worker” and industrialist: reindustrialisation, higher tariffs, aggressive elimination of “unfair practices”, and the rebuilding of the defence industrial base.

At the same time, the document openly rejects decarbonisation policies and the goals of the green transition — policies the European Commission has presented as the foundation of Europe’s economic future. This model has visibly failed: the countries that pursued the most radical versions of the green transition now face the highest energy prices, the greatest regulatory burdens, and the most severe economic stagnation.

This naturally introduces the risk of a new wave of trade disputes, in which Europe’s green industrial policies, emissions charges, and regulatory measures could become targets of American retaliatory actions. Combined with the U.S. energy strategy — which re-prioritises fossil fuels and nuclear power — the EU could find itself technologically and energetically trapped between its own economically damaging regulatory excesses and a far more assertive American energy and technology offer. I view this as a well-deserved corrective for the current European Commission leadership and political elite — and as an opportunity for Europe to correct its course.

Politically, the strategy shifts the centre of U.S. attention away from Europe toward the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. For Europe, this means becoming more “regional” and less “central” in Washington’s strategic calculus, while still remaining important as an economic base and as a potential partner in competition with China. The strategy emphasises that the United States requires “a strong Europe that remains European” — a Europe composed of aligned sovereign states rather than a technocratic supranational project. In practice, this means Washington will simultaneously encourage both strengthened defence capabilities and greater political fragmentation if the EU is perceived as too centralised or ideologically distant from the American vision of the West.

For Slovenia, as a small, export-oriented, and deeply integrated EU member, the implications are multilayered. In defence and security terms, the 5% GDP target is unattainable in the near term, as it would jeopardise other essential state functions. Political pressure from Washington could place Slovenia in a dilemma: follow U.S. expectations and align with states ready to rapidly increase defence spending, or advocate a more gradual, EU-coordinated path. The former risks marginalisation within the EU, while the latter risks tensions within NATO. Yet this is not an unsolvable issue: creative budgeting — particularly investment in dual-use capabilities — could offer an elegant solution.

Economically and energetically, Slovenia faces the same dilemmas as the EU. If the United States tightens trade and industrial pressure, Slovenian export sectors — especially those integrated into German and Italian supply chains — could be significantly affected. On the other hand, an energy partnership with the United States and the re-establishment of economic ties with Russia could give Slovenia access to gas and advanced nuclear technologies, both essential for securing competitive energy prices and long-term energy autonomy.

In foreign-policy terms, the shift in U.S. strategy may open space for Slovenia to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic position on Ukraine. If the United States actively promotes a faster peace settlement, Slovenia will have the opportunity to evolve from passively mirroring the hardest European positions to adopting a more balanced approach that combines support for stability with a realistic understanding of new geopolitical dynamics. This would expand Slovenia’s diplomatic autonomy, soften ideological reflexes inherited from the EU’s militant line, and allow Slovenia to develop into a bridge between the West and Eurasia — bringing greater strategic relevance and economic opportunity.

Domestically, this shift may act as a catalyst for a more mature and balanced debate on Slovenia’s developmental trajectory. Instead of uncritically reproducing the militant and regulatory extremes that have characterised EU policymaking in recent years, Slovenia can use the new geopolitical opening to craft a foreign policy rooted in national interests, energy diversification, technological openness, and reduced dependence on ideologically driven EU policies. This represents a transition from reactivity to strategic thinking — and an opportunity for a more inclusive national dialogue that transcends the divisions deepened by Europe’s identity crisis and regulatory overreach.

For Slovenia, the most sensible approach is therefore to design a coherent two-track strategy: maintaining strong, pragmatic relations with the United States while simultaneously expanding room for manoeuvre with Eurasian partners. Slovenia should remain an EU member, of course, but no longer a hostage to policies that hinder development or generate unnecessary conflict. Such a strategy would allow Slovenia to step beyond the binary choice between geopolitical poles and instead operate as a state capable of balancing its interests, maximising economic opportunities, and reducing exposure to strategic risks. It is precisely this balance and pragmatism that can provide a small state like Slovenia with greater influence and stability in a rapidly changing international environment.