Craig Tindale je v nedavno objavljenem vrhunskem članku analiziral temeljni strukturni premik v globalnem gospodarstvu, ki ga označuje kot »vrnitev materije«. V ospredje se vrača fizična materialna baza gospodarstva – rudarjenje, predelava, taljenje in rafinacija – ki je bila v zadnjih desetletjih v zahodnih gospodarstvih sistematično zapostavljena v korist finančnih storitev, intelektualne lastnine in programske opreme. Predpostavka o neomejeni dostopnosti surovin prek globalnih trgov se je izkazala za strateško zmotno.
Spodaj je povzetek članka, pred tem pa štiri uvodni odstavki, ki zadenejo v srčiko naše zahodne teoretske zablode in zablode ekonomskih politik v zadnjih desetletjih.
The global industrial system is currently navigating a profound structural bifurcation, a phenomenon best described as the “Return of Matter.” For the past three decades, Western economies have operated under the tacit Neoclassical assumption that control over intellectual property, financial instruments, and software code constitutes the apex of value creation. In this worldview, the physical processes of industrialism, the dirty, energy-intensive work of mining, refining, smelting, and alloying, were viewed as commoditised, low-margin utilities that could be outsourced to low-cost jurisdictions without strategic peril.
The post-Cold War era was defined by the assumption of “infinite materiality”: the deeply held economic belief that, with sufficient capital and open trade routes, any physical resource could be procured in the necessary quantities, at any time, from a friction-free global market. This paradigm facilitated the rise of the “Just-in-Time” logistics model, which ruthlessly optimised supply chains for financial efficiency, stripping out inventory buffers and redundancy at the expense of systemic resilience. As of late 2025, this era of assumed abundance has definitively concluded. We have entered an era of complex constraints, where the physical availability of matter, not the availability of credit, sets the limit on national power.
The trigger for this crisis was (and still is) policy, a decades-long triumph of a specific worldview. Rooted in the comparative advantage theories of David Ricardo and the monetary theories of Milton Friedman, and later codified in the Washington Consensus, this ideology modelled nations as frictionless points on a trade diagram rather than political actors with distinct security interests and potential enemies. It prescribed a rigorous division of labour: the West should specialise in high-margin “thinking” (services, IP design, complex finance) while offshoring the “dirty” work of “doing” (smelting, refining, processing) to the lowest bidder.
Deepened by the naivety of economic rationalism and the “End of History” optimism of the 1990s, the West adopted a financial system that effectively disarmed its security. Inside that intellectual frame, dismantling the domestic material productive economy looked rational, efficient, and profitable. In the real world of power politics, geography, and supply shocks, it was a slow-motion act of strategic self-harm that hollowed out the industrial base required to sustain a conflict or a protracted crisis.
Dolgotrajno prevladujoča predpostavka zahodnih gospodarstev, da je mogoče fizične vire in industrijske procese obravnavati kot vedno dostopne dobrine, se izkazuje za strateško napačno. Finančna moč, intelektualna lastnina in programska oprema ne morejo nadomestiti fizičnih zmogljivosti rudarjenja, rafiniranja in predelave surovin. Meja nacionalne moči se ponovno vzpostavlja tam, kjer se stikajo energija, materiali in industrijska infrastruktura.


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