Včeraj je pred sestankom s kitajskim predsednikom Xi Jinpingom ameriški predsednik Donald Trump tvital o skorajšnjem srečanju G2. S tem je priznal novo globalno realnost z dvema globalnima velesilama oziroma povratek  v obdobje pred letom 1990. V času prve globalne hladne vojne (1945-1990) smo imeli dvopolarni svet (ZDA in Sovjetska zveza na čelu svojih satelitov) in Neuvrščenimi kot simpatičnimi “leftovers”, po padcu berlinskega zidu in “koncu zgodovine” smo imeli enopolarni svet z globalno dominacijo ZDA. ZDA so se v tem času, ko so želele širšo podporo za svoje enostranske interese in / ali vojaške aktivnosti šle tudi šarado z G7.

No, včeraj in po desetletju druge globalne hladne vojne je ta šarada formalno odpadla, Trump je priznal, da sta zgolj dve državi, ki se lahko enakovredno pogovarjata o globalni ureditvi – ZDA in Kitajska. Vprašanje pa je, ali si Kitajska res, vsaj uradno, želi tega statusa “sopredsedujoče sveta”, kajti to je v nasprotju z njeno dosedanjo doktrino in v nasprotju z dosedanjo strategijo, kjer se vsem državam ponuja kot miroljuben, enakovreden trgovinski partner, ki se ne želi vmešavati v notranje zadeve držav partneric oziroma biti to, kar so ZDA – globalni vladar in policaj.

Spodaj je dober komentar Arnauda Bertranda na to temo, ki pojasnjuje, zakaj Kitajska že več kot desetletje zavrača ameriške pobude za t. i. »G2« ureditev sveta, v kateri bi skupaj z ZDA vodila globalni red. Temeljni razlogi so tako ideološki kot strateški. Peking se sklicuje na svoje načelo neposeganja in na »pet načel miroljubnega sožitja«, po katerih so vse države enakovredne in imajo pravico do samostojnega razvoja. Ideja o delitvi svetovnega vodstva z eno silo bi bila v nasprotju z zgodovinsko izkušnjo Kitajske z imperializmom in s Deng Xiaopingovim opozorilom, da se Kitajska nikoli ne sme spremeniti v hegemonistično superdržavo.

Poleg tega bi se s pristankom na G2 Kitajska izolirala od držav v razvoju, s katerimi gradi politične in gospodarske vezi, ter izgubila možnost neuvrščenega manevriranja. Zato Kitajska namesto »skupnega vladanja svetu« ponuja model »odnosov med velikima državama novega tipa«, ki temelji na treh načelih: ne-konfrontaciji, medsebojnem spoštovanju in sodelovanju v obojestransko korist. To pomeni, da želi biti enakovreden partner ZDA, ne pa zaveznik ali sopredsedujoča sila svetovnemu redu.

Moj medklic v tej hvalevredni usmeritvi Kitajske je naslednji: že mogoče res, da si Kitajska zaenkrat tega statusa G2 morda ne želi, toda z rastjo njene globalne gospodarske in tehnološke moči raste tudi njena politična moč in hkrati potreba, da zaščiti svoje gospodarske interese s političnimi sredstvi. In slej ko prej bo morala svoj nevtralni status zamenjati za bolj aktivnega. V Južnokitajskem morju to že dve desetletji počne. Ampak tudi do tega preskoka bo prišlo spontano v skladu z rastjo njene globalne gospodarske in tehnološke premoči in potrebe po zaščiti svojih interesov.

Since Trump is raising the possibility of a “G2” where, in his words, China and the U.S. could “together solve all the problems in the world”, it’s worth noting that this isn’t the first time an American leader has proposed such an arrangement – and that China has consistently said no to U.S. proposals to jointly rule the world.

It’s an idea that’s actually been around for 16 years, first proposed by economist Fred Bergsten (at the time the founding director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics) in an article entitled “A Partnership of Equals” (https://foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-06-01/partnership-equals ) in which he argued that the US should develop a true partnership with Beijing to provide joint leadership of the global economic system. A “G2” approach, Bergsten argued, was the only way to properly acknowledge China’s new role as a global economic superpower.

The idea gained significant traction within the Obama administration. Hillary Clinton – Secretary of State at the time – spoke of the US and China being “in the same boat” during her visits to Beijing. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as an advisor to Obama during his campaign, actively promoted the concept, and even Henry Kissinger joined in, suggesting the US and China should build a “community of destiny” similar to post-WWII transatlantic relations.

However, China consistently and firmly rejected these proposals for joint global leadership. The pushback became so necessary that Premier Wen Jiabao had to address it explicitly during a May 2009 EU-China summit in Prague, calling the G2 concept “baseless and wrong” because “China will never seek hegemony” and “one or two countries, or a group of major powers cannot solve global problems.” (https://mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/1206_679930/1209_679940/200905/t20090521_9389317.shtml )

He also directly told Obama in November 2009 that China wouldn’t go for a G2, explaining to him that “the main reasons [China] doesn’t agree with the concept of a ‘G2’ are”: “First, China is a developing country with a large population, and we remain clear-headed about the long road ahead to build a modernized nation; Second, China pursues an independent and autonomous peaceful foreign policy and does not ally with any country or group of countries; Third, China maintains that world affairs should be decided jointly by all countries, not dictated by one or two countries.” (https://gov.cn/ldhd/2009-11/18/content_1467520.htm )

This rejection stems from China’s fundamentally different vision of international relations. Since the 1950s, China has promoted an alternative to great power politics through its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These principles, born from China’s own experience with imperialism, envision a world where all nations – regardless of size or power – interact as equals. From this perspective, a G2 arrangement wouldn’t just be strategically unwise – it would contradict China’s core vision of how international relations should work.

Even Deng Xiaoping, when addressing the UN, explicitly warned against China ever becoming the kind of superpower that would dominate others. He declared that “if one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, she too should play the tyrant and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.” (https://globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1227967.shtml ). He defined a “superpower” precisely as what China didn’t want to be: “an imperialist country which everywhere subjects other countries to its aggression, interference, control, subversion or plunder and strives for world hegemony”.

Plus, from a purely down-to-earth strategic perspective, it would make very little sense for China to establish a G2 with the U.S. as it would isolate China from other nations, particularly the developing world where China has cultivated relationships for decades. And I don’t think any Chinese thinker truly believes the U.S. would ever offer a genuine “equal partnership” to China, especially looking at how the U.S. treats its other “equal partners” like Europe…

So what WOULD China want when it comes to its relations with the U.S.? In response to these recurring proposals, Xi Jinping developed his own framework for US-China relations when he became leader in 2012. He called it alternatively “major country relations” (大国关系) or a “new type of great power relations” (新型大国关系), built on three core principles:

1) No conflict and no confrontation (不冲突、不对抗)

2) Mutual respect (相互尊重)

3) Win-win cooperation (合作共赢)

In practice, this means China seeks:

• Recognition as an equal partner but NOT joint leadership of the global order
• Issue-specific cooperation rather than comprehensive alignment
• Clear respect for its “red lines” and core interests
• Cooperation primarily through multilateral institutions rather than bilateral arrangements
• The ability to maintain its policy independence and non-aligned status
• Economic engagement without political conditions

This vision has become increasingly specific over time. In his meeting last month with Biden in Lima, Xi was extremely direct, laying out “7 lessons of the past 4 years that need to be remembered” (https://guancha.cn/internation/2024_11_17_755645.shtml ), among which:

• He said that “there must be correct strategic understanding. The ‘Thucydides Trap’ is not historical destiny, a ‘new Cold War’ cannot and should not be fought, containment of China is unwise, undesirable, and will not succeed.”
• He called out U.S. duplicity, warning that “words must be trustworthy and actions must be fruitful. A person cannot stand without credibility. China always follows through on its words, but if the U.S. side always says one thing and does another, it is very detrimental to America’s image and damages mutual trust.”
• He reiterated that both countries need to “treat each other as equals. In exchanges between two major countries like China and the United States, neither side can reshape the other according to their own wishes, nor can they suppress the other based on so-called ‘position of strength,’ let alone deprive the other of legitimate development rights to maintain their own leading position.”
• He warned that “red lines and bottom lines cannot be challenged. As two major countries, China and the United States inevitably have some contradictions and differences, but they cannot harm each other’s core interests, let alone engage in conflict and confrontation. The One China principle and the three China-US joint communiqués are the political foundation of bilateral relations and must be strictly observed. Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, development path, and development rights are China’s four red lines, which cannot be challenged. [Note: Bold text in the original] These are the most important guardrails and safety nets for China-US relations.”
• He said that “there should be more dialogue and cooperation. Under current circumstances, the common interests between China and the United States have not decreased but increased.”
• Specifically on global leadership he said that both countries need to “demonstrate great power responsibility. China and the United States should always consider the future and destiny of humanity, take responsibility for world peace, provide public goods for the world, and play a positive role in world unity, including engaging in positive interaction, avoiding mutual consumption, and not coercing other countries to take sides.”

So, to conclude, while we don’t know exactly what Trump meant when he said that China and the US could “together solve all the problems in the world”, I think it would be mistaken to expect China to agree to a joint US-China global leadership. From Deng’s explicit rejection of superpower politics to Wen Jiabao’s firm “no” to Obama, to Xi’s recent articulation of China’s red lines – China has maintained a clear position: they seek a stable relationship of equals with clear boundaries, not a “let’s rule the world together” type of arrangement which is antithetical to China’s principles.

Vir: Arnaud Bertrand