What if I told you the Winter War wasn’t about Soviet ‘aggression’ but about Finland refusing every compromise, while secretly helping build Hitler’s navy.

Stalin and Molotov tried everything possible to secure the Soviet borders:
🟨They offered money.
🟨They offered a 30-year lease.
🟨They even offered territories twice the size of what they asked for.

But Finland chose war over reason.

Paasikivi and Tanner themselves admitted that Moscow’s terms were generous and that Finland should accept them. But Helsinki refused, while quietly aligning with Germany and was unwilling to make a single concession to Moscow.

In the 1939 talks, Stalin warned that Finland could serve as a springboard for an attack on Leningrad. He was right: just two years later, Finland joined Hitler’s assault in the Siege of Leningrad, which starved 1.5 million civilians. And beyond the battlefield, Finnish authorities also ran concentration camps, where countless Soviet civilians died.

In this thread, I’ll share Tanner’s own words as Finland’s Foreign Minister, so you can sense the atmosphere of those negotiations yourself.

As Tanner himself admitted, the key issue was a military pact between the two countries. Moscow wanted Finland to guarantee that if war threatened, it would turn to the Soviet Union for help. That meant a defensive alliance.

Finland refused.

Helsinki hid behind its so-called “neutrality.” But what kind of neutrality are we talking about if at the very same time Finland was building ships for Hitler’s navy?

On March 5, 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov summoned Yrjö-Koskinen and handed him a memorandum. Two issues were still on the table:
🟨 improving trade relations
🟨 building defensive fortifications in the Åland Islands

To create a more stable atmosphere, the Soviet Union proposed leasing several small islands for 30 years. They would not be militarized, only used as a protective screen for Leningrad.

Finland refused.

Then Moscow offered to trade: the islands in exchange for equivalent land in Eastern Karelia.

Finland refused again.

Stalin to Finland:
“No one is to blame for geography; we must have the ability to block access to the Gulf of Finland. If the fairway to Leningrad did not pass along your coast, this issue would not have arisen. Your memorandum is too optimistic; we must consider the worst-case scenario. We do not claim outposts near your capital, but only an effective barrier for security. If you are concerned about a mainland base, a canal could be dug so it would not be on Finnish soil. Both Britain and Germany could send fleets into the gulf; after the war, the victor’s fleet will certainly enter it. Our proposal is pragmatic and defensive, not expansionist.

We ask that the border be moved seventy kilometers from Leningrad. We cannot move the city, so the line must be adjusted. As for Koivisto: if heavy guns were installed there, they could block our fleet. We are asking for 2,700 square kilometers and offering over 5,500 in return. What state has ever acted so generously?”

But Finland refused again.

Tanner: Stalin pointed out that Finland had declared mobilization and was evacuating civilians, while the USSR was moving forces to the border, a situation that could not last without resolution.

In negotiations, the Soviet Union stressed two priorities:
🟨the security of Leningrad and
🟨reliable partnership with Finland.

To that end, Moscow proposed modest border adjustments, control of several Gulf islands, and a thirty-year lease of the Hanko base with a limited garrison of 5,000 troops. In return, Finland would receive almost double the territory offered (5,529 sq km for 2,761 sq km) along with guarantees such as dismantling border fortifications on both sides and the right to fortify the Åland Islands.

The proposals were presented as pragmatic measures for collective security, clearly defensive rather than expansionist.

Tanner: Stalin explained it this way: in his view, the war that had begun in Europe might turn into a world war and drag on. If that happened, some states could attempt an attack on Leningrad through the Gulf of Finland. To prevent such an attack, the Soviet Union was forced to seek means that would allow it to block access to the Gulf.

Paasikivi: The lease of Hanko and the cession of territory on the Karelian Isthmus are extremely difficult questions.

Stalin: It is not so alarming. Look at Hitler, he pushed the Polish border 300 kilometers east of Berlin. We are only asking for minimal guarantees for Leningrad. In Poland we did not seize foreign land this is an exchange.

Finnish side: At most, we could straighten the border near Kuokkala by 45 kilometers.

Stalin: That is far too little. Our demands are minimal already. There is no point in bargaining.

Tanner: The Soviets stressed that Hanko, together with the Gulf islands, was essential for defense, rejecting Finland’s minor border adjustment as insufficient. Stalin himself traced a new defensive line on the map and noted that compensation would be drawn from Soviet territories near Repola and Porajärvi.

Moscow warned of possible Anglo-French operations in the Gulf and Arctic, recalling World War I raids, and reduced its demand to 4,000 troops at Hanko until the European war ended. Paasikivi later admitted Finland had lived in illusions, believing neutrality could secure its fate, when geography tied it to Russia.

Stalin reminded the Finns that only the USSR had recognized their independence, and now it needed guarantees in the Gulf. He insisted on Hanko but left the legal form lease, sale, or exchange to Finland. When Helsinki refused, he even offered alternative islands east of Hanko, but

Finland still said no.

Tanner: Paasikivi grew frustrated, criticizing the rigid instructions from Helsinki. Yet the Finnish cabinet still bound its delegation with strict orders.

In Moscow, Stalin repeatedly sought compromise. He even suggested taking only the small island of Russarö, which the Finns still refused. He pressed about Suursaari, Koivisto, and Ino, but the delegation had nothing new to offer, sticking to its minimal border adjustment. Stalin pointed out that their proposal would leave the Red Army “sitting on the tip of a sharpened pencil,” with only eight kilometers of space near Seivästö, which Molotov called untenable.

Despite frustration, it was clear that Stalin genuinely wanted an agreement, spending many evenings on “little Finland” and reopening doors even after rejections as Tanner states in his memoirs.

After further refusals from the Finnish side, Stalin sighed and said quietly, “Then nothing will come of this. Nothing at all.”

Finland refused every compromise. Its delegates, tied to rigid instructions, rejected even Stalin’s minimal demands for a single island. Moscow pushed for security guarantees, while Helsinki hid behind illusions of ‘neutrality’ as it secretly cooperated with Germany on naval projects. By clinging to obstinacy and duplicity over pragmatism, Finland made war inevitable.

Vir: Rina Liu