Tudi mediji, kot je The Economist, ki so tri leta in pol dan za dnem gobezdali o nujnosti in veliki verjetnosti ukrajinske zmage nad Rusijo (poglejte posebni meni, namenjen propagandi o vojni v Ukrajini), nekega dne obrnejo ploščo in propagirajo pozitivne plati ukrajinskega poraza. Zdaj je postal popularen model “finlandizacije Ukrajine” v skladu z mirovnim sporazumom med Finsko in nekdanjo Sovjetsko zvezo. Za osvežitev spomina: Začelo se je s sovjetsko invazijo na Finsko 30. novembra 1939 (zaradi sovjetskih “varnostnih razlogov”), končalo pa se je tri mesece in pol pozneje po “zimski vojni” z Moskovsko mirovno pogodbo 13. marca 1940. Finska se je v skladu s sporazumom morala odpovedati 9 % ozemlja in pristati na vojaško nevtralnost, in po novem sporazumu iz 1944 je bila brez omejitev (po 1945) glede finskega vključevanja v evropske integracijske procese.
Finski predsednik Alexander Stubb zdaj ta model priporoča Trumpu kot uspešen model rešitve ukrajinske vojne. Torej skoraj natanko to, kar Rusija zahteva od začetka vojne – vojaško nevtralnost Ukrajine, in kar Rusija eksplicitno dopušča – možnost Ukrajine glede vključitve v EU. Ključna razlika glede na “moskovski mirovni sporazum” iz marca 1940 je v tem, da Rusija v začetku vojne ni zahtevala ukrajinskega ozemlja (razen Krima, ki je bil vedno ruski) in da osnutek sporazuma iz Istanbula (iz marca 2022) tega tudi ni predvideval. Rusija je v začetku vojne zahtevala zgolj zaščito ruske manjšine v štirih vzhodnih regijah, ki tvorijo t.i. Novo Rusijo in osnutek mirovnega sporazuma je predvideval avtonomijo teh 4 regij. Ruske ozemeljske zahteve so prišle šele z ukrajinskim nasprotovanjem mirovnemu sporazumu iz Istanbula in s kasnejšo formalno aneksacijo teh regij (po referendumih septembra 2022) in ruskim vojaškim zavzetjem večine teritorija teh regij.
Torej finski predsednik Stubb predlaga “realpolitično opcijo” po vzoru Finske – da se Ukrajina odpove delu ozemlja, da pristane na vojaško nevtralnost in da ohrani avtonomijo in s tem dobi možnost vključitve v EU. To naj bi bil po njegovem temelj finske zgodbe o uspehu v danih realpolitičlnih okoliščinah.
THE TYRANT in the Kremlin claimed it as within his sphere of influence, and demanded an unequal land swap. When it was rejected, he staged a false-flag operation and then invaded, expecting to take the capital in two weeks. The Western democracies promised support, but failed to deliver. Less than five years later the victim was forced to cede a tenth of its territory to Russia, and to promise perpetual neutrality. That was the fate not of Ukraine this decade but of Finland in the 1940s. It is now one of the most successful and prosperous of European states.
Finland is back in focus these days. Its leader was included in a meeting last month at the White House between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelensky and six other European leaders. When Mr Trump turned to Alexander Stubb, Finland’s president, one of Ukraine’s staunchest and most cool-headed supporters, said: “We found a solution in 1944, and I’m sure that we’ll be able to find a solution in 2025 to end Russia’s war of aggression, find and get a lasting and just peace.” And in a recent interview in Helsinki with The Economist he said of the 1944 decision, seen by many as a defeat, that “We still feel we won, because we retained our independence.”
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Yet unlike any other part of the former Russian empire, and many countries of central and eastern Europe as well, Finland, a country today of fewer than 6m people faced with a 1,300km border with Russia, never lost its independence or its democracy. It owed this not to Western support but to the grit of its people, the integrity of its elite and the hard realism of the man who commanded its army through the years of war—Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, formerly a general in the Russian Imperial Army who was as resolute in putting up the fight as he was in accepting a bitter peace.
In March 1940, after “16 weeks of bloody battle with no rest by day or by night”, Mannerheim addressed his soldiers: “Our Army still stands unconquered before an enemy which in spite of terrible losses has grown in numbers.” The underwhelming scale of Western support and the overwhelming size and brutality of an enemy “whose life-philosophy and moral values are different from ours”, meant that although Stalin failed to achieve his maximalist goals, Finland had to forfeit land, but not its people.
“We must be ready to defend our diminished Fatherland with the same resolution and the same fire with which we defended our undivided Fatherland,” Mannerheim said. The entire population of Finnish Karelia—over 400,000 people—was evacuated after the end of the Winter War and the subsequent War of Continuation, in which for a while Finland pushed the Russians back.
Finland’s experience has been cited from the start of the war in Ukraine—both as a model to avoid and one perhaps to follow. Mannerheim’s speech was circulated in President Volodymyr Zelensky’s office in the first months of the war, but was put to one side.
The peace that was imposed on Finland in 1944 was hardly just. But it could have been worse. Finland handed over 10% of its territory, including Karelia and half of Lake Ladoga. Its army was restricted, as was its ability to join NATO. It was forced to let Russia lease a naval base on Porkkala, a peninsula in the Gulf of Finland just 30km from the capital. And, because it had joined forces with Hitler, it was forced to pay reparations to the Soviet Union which had attacked it five years earlier.
To much of the world, this was a defeat. To Mr Stubb, whose father was born in the territory annexed by the Soviet Union, and whose summer house stands in Porkkala, back in Finnish hands since the 1950s, it looks different.
Lacking any security guarantees from the West or anyone else, Finland exercised this independence not by turning anti-Russian—which would almost certainly have resulted in another invasion—but by building one of the most successful countries in Europe. “People didn’t wait for perfect conditions. They worked with what they had,” Risto Penttilä, a foreign-policy expert, explains.
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In politics and in the media Finland carefully avoided anything that could anger Moscow. To most outsiders, what became known as “Finlandisation” was a servile form of appeasement. To Mr Stubb and most of his countrymen, “it was the definition of realpolitik at a time when we did not have a choice.” It allowed Finland to stick to its core values: universal education, social welfare and the rule of law.
“Zimska vojna” med Finsko in Sovjetsko zvezo
The Winter War[F 6] was a war between the Soviet Union and Finland. It began with a Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939, three months after the outbreak of World War II, and ended three and a half months later with the Moscow Peace Treaty on 13 March 1940. Despite superior military strength, especially in tanks and aircraft, the Soviet Union suffered severe losses and initially made little headway. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal and expelled the Soviet Union from its organization.
The Soviets made several demands, including that Finland cede substantial border territories in exchange for land elsewhere, claiming security reasons – primarily the protection of Leningrad, 32 km (20 mi) from the Finnish border. When Finland refused, the Soviets invaded. Most sources conclude that the Soviet Union had intended to conquer all of Finland, and cite the establishment of the puppet Finnish Communist government and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact‘s secret protocols as evidence of this,[F 7] while other sources argue against the idea of a full Soviet conquest.[F 8] Finland repelled Soviet attacks for more than two months and inflicted substantial losses on the invaders in temperatures as low as −43 °C (−45 °F). The battles focused mainly on Taipale along the Karelian Isthmus, on Kollaa in Ladoga Karelia and on Raate Road in Kainuu, but there were also battles in Lapland and North Karelia.
Following the initial setbacks, the Soviets reduced their strategic objectives and put an end to the puppet Finnish communist government in late January 1940, and informed the legitimate Finnish government that they were willing to negotiate peace.[38][39] After the Soviet military reorganized and adopted different tactics, they renewed their offensive in February 1940 and overcame the Finnish defences on the Karelian Isthmus. This left the Finnish army in the main theatre of war near the breaking point, with a retreat seeming inevitable. Consequently, Finnish commander-in-chief Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim urged a peace deal with the Soviets, while the Finns still retained bargaining power.
Hostilities ceased in March 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty in which Finland ceded 9% of its territory to the Soviet Union. Soviet losses were heavy, and the country’s international reputation suffered.[41] Their gains exceeded their pre-war demands, and the Soviets received substantial territories along Lake Ladoga and further north. Finland retained its sovereignty and enhanced its international reputation.
Vir: Wikipedia
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