Adam Posen je v odličnem članku v Foreign Affairs izvrstno opisal vlogo ZDA, ki so se iz zavarovalca prelevile v ekstraktorja dobičkov. Iz zaščitnika v predatorja svojih zaveznikov. Posen je to spremembo sicer pripisal Trumpu kot tistemu, ki naj bi preoblikoval vlogo ZDA iz globalnega varuha stabilnosti v stroj za izčrpavanje dobičkov (premij za zavarovanje). Toda Trump je zgolj tisti politik, ki je to vlogo ZDA kot predatorja svojih zaveznikov tako brutalno razgalil, kajti vse ameriške administracije pred njim so po drugi svetovni vojni izkoriščale svojo vojaško, tehnološko in finančno dominacijo nad Evropo, Japonsko, Južno Korejo ter Kanado, Avstralijo in Novo Zelandijo za pobiranje premij za zavarovanje. Ne samo za doseganje svojih političnih interesov, pač pa za ekstrakcijo konkretnih dobičkov njenih vojaških in tehnoloških podjetij ter finančnih družb. Le da tega nihče ni javno razglašal.

Kot je komentiral Arnaud Bertrand, gre za nekakšen sodobni trojanski konj: ZDA najprej nastopijo kot zaščitnik, dokler drugi ne zgradijo svoje prihodnosti na zaupanju vanje, nato pa se prelevijo v plenilca.

Perverzno. Toda še bolj perverzno je to, da ZDA izčrpavajo svoje zaveznike namesto svojih nasprotnikov. Najmanj negativnih posledic zaradi tega bo občutila Kitajska, medtem ko bodo najtesnejši ameriški zavezniki utrpeli največ škode. Kitajska je izgradila svojo avtonomno finančno in tehnološko infrastrukturo (in jo nadgradila z monopolom v ključnih segmentih dobavnih verig, kot so redke zemlje), zaradi česar je ne samo imuna na morebitna ameriška izsiljevanja, pač pa ima sama močnejšo pogajalsko pozicijo od ZDA. Evropske države so tiste, ki so se izkazale kot absolutni luzerji, saj so  na treh ključnih področjih vojaško, tehnološko in finančno povsem odvisne od ZDA. Ameriška administracija lahko v kateremkoli trenutku ugasne Evropo (nenadoma finačne transakcije nehajo delovati, elektronska pošta in internet ne delujeta več, ni več jedrske zaščite itd.). In ker to lahko, je Evropa tako naivna, tako lahka in tako nemočna žrtev ameriškega predatorja.

Dvomim, da se bo Evropa lahko izvila iz tega ameriškega primeža – potrebna bi bila vojaška, tehnološka in finančna osamosvojitev od ZDA, o čemer sem večkrat pisal v zadnjih dveh letih. Toda ta osamosvojitev se ne bo zgodila, in sicer preprosto iz razloga, ker je Evropa po drugi svetovni vojni vojaško okupirana s strani ZDA in ker lahko ameriška adminsitracija prek svojih podjetij kadarkoli ugasne Evropo.

Toda ostale države pa bodo oziroma že izvajajo geopolitično prestrukturiranje, in sicer od ZDA h Kitajski. Kitajska je zaenkrat bolj benevolenten zavarovatelj od ZDA. Toda tudi to se bo spremenila, ko bodo države postale trgovinsko, tehnološko in finančno povsem odvisne od nje. Zato je edina smiselna strategija vseh držav doseči stopnjo čim večje strateške avtonomije na ključnih področjih, predvsem na vojaškem, tehnološkem, finančnem, prehranskem in energetskem. To je sicer dražji, vendar edini način za dosego strateške nacionalne varnosti.

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The post-American world economy has arrived. U.S. President Donald Trump’s radical shift in economic approach has already begun to change norms, behaviors, and institutions globally. Like a major earthquake, it has given rise to new features in the landscape and rendered many existing economic structures unusable. This event was a political choice, not an inevitable natural disaster. But the changes that it is driving are here to stay. No guardrails will automatically restore the previous status quo.

To understand these changes, many analysts and politicians focus on the degree to which supply chains and trade in manufactured goods are shifting between the United States and China. But that focus is too narrow. Asking whether the United States or China will remain central to the world’s economy—or looking primarily at trade balances—yields a dramatic underestimate of the scope and impact of Trump’s changed approach and how comprehensively the prior U.S. framework undergirded the economic decisions made by almost every state, financial institution, and company worldwide.

In essence, the global public goods that the United States provided after the end of World War II—among others, the ability to securely navigate the air and seas, the presumption that property is safe from expropriation, rules for international trade, and stable dollar assets in which to transact business and store money—can be thought of, in economic terms, as forms of insurance. The United States collected premiums from the countries that participated in the system it led in a variety of ways, including through its ability to set rules that made the U.S. economy the most attractive one to investors. In return, the societies that bought into the system were freed to expend much less effort on securing their economies against uncertainty, enabling them to pursue the commerce that helped them flourish.

Some pressures had been building within this system before Trump’s ascent. But particularly in his second term, Trump has switched the United States’ role from global insurer to extractor of profit. Instead of the insurer securing its clients against external threats, under the new regime, the threat against which insurance is sold comes as much from the insurer as from the global environment. The Trump administration promises to spare clients from its own assaults for a higher price than before. Trump has threatened to block access to American markets on a broad scale; made the protections that come with military alliances explicitly dependent on the purchase of U.S. weapons, energy, and industrial products; required foreigners who want to operate businesses in the United States to make side payments to his personal priorities; and pressured Mexico, Vietnam, and other countries to drop Chinese industrial inputs or investment by Chinese companies. These acts are on a scale unprecedented in modern U.S. governance.

The United States’ withdrawal of its former insurance will fundamentally change the behavior of the country’s clients and its clients’ clients—and not in the ways that Trump hopes. China, the country whose behavior most U.S. officials want to change, will likely be the least affected, while the United States’ closest allies will be the most damaged. As other U.S. partners watch these reliant allies suffer, they will seek to self-insure instead, at great cost to them. Assets will become harder to save and investment abroad less appealing. As their exposure to global economic and security risks rises, governments will find that both foreign diversification and macroeconomic policy have become less effective tools for stabilizing their economies.

Vir: Adam Posen, Foreign Affairs