Praktično vsi evropski politiki in komentatorji se strinajo, da je dogovor Ursule von der Leyen z Donaldom Trumpom o trgovini in investicijah, sklenjen na škotskem golf turnirju v Turnberryju, je ponižujoč in škodljiv za Evropsko unijo. Dogovor slabi mednarodno verodostojnost EU, saj ne ščiti načel recipročnosti in pravične trgovine, temveč se uklanja ameriškemu pritisku. Gospodarsko je enostranski: EU izgublja dostop do ameriškega trga, medtem ko ZDA pridobivajo prednost na evropskem. Von der Leyen je brez mandata obljubila 600 milijard evrov investicij v ZDA, kar krepi kapitalski odtok iz Evrope. K dogovoru so prispevale notranje razpoke med članicami, zlasti Nemčijo in Irsko, ki sta podlegli interesom avtomobilske industrije in tehnoloških velikanov.

Vendar dogovor še ni potrjen, saj niso dorečeni vsi detajli, parlamentarna in vladna ratifikacija pa utegneta povzročiti odpor.  EU bi morala izkoristiti še odprto priložnost za spremembo pogojev in preprečiti dolgoročno škodo.

Ursula von der Leyen’s Turnberry golf course deal has been rightly called a capitulation and a humiliation for Europe. Assuming such an accord would put an end to Donald Trump’s coercion and bullying was either naive or the result of a miserable delusion. The EU should now steel itself and reject the terms imposed by Trump.

Is this deal really as bad as it sounds? Unfortunately, it is, for at least three reasons.

The blow to Europe’s international credibility is incalculable in a world that expects the EU to stand up for reciprocity and rules-based trade, to resist Washington’s coercion as Canada, China and Brazil have, rather than condoning it.

Economically, it’s a damaging one-way street: EU exporters lose market access in the US while the EU market is hit by more favoured US competition. Core European industrial sectors such as pharma and steel and aluminium are left by the wayside. The balance also tilts in the US’s favour in important sectors such as consumer goods, food and drink, and agriculture. Tariffs tend to stick, so this is long-term damage. The EU even gives up its right to respond to future US pressures through duties on digital services or network fees.

To top it off, von der Leyen’s defence and investment pledges (for which she had no mandate) go against Europe’s interest. The EU’s competitiveness predicament is precisely one of net investment outflows. As international capital now reallocates under the pressures of Trumponomics and a weakening dollar, the case for Europe to become a strategic investment power was strengthening. Von der Leyen’s promise of $600bn in EU investment in the US is therefore disastrous messaging.

How could this happen? All EU member states wanted to avoid Trump’s 30% tariff threat and a trade war, but none perhaps as much as Germany and Ireland, supported by German carmakers and US big tech firms. Yet Irish sweetheart digital tax deals, as well as BMW and Mercedes’s plans to move production hubs to the US (also to serve the EU market), cannot be Europe’s future.

EU governments were distinctly unhelpful in building the EU’s negotiating position. But in the end, it was von der Leyen who blinked and she has to take responsibility. Her close team took control in the closing weeks and went into the final meeting manifestly prepared only to say yes, which made Trump’s steamrolling inevitable.

Let’s think of the counterfactual: if von der Leyen had stepped into the room and rejected these terms, Trump’s wrath and some market turmoil may have ensued. But ultimately it would very likely have come to a postponement, a new negotiation and, at some point, a different deal that would not be so lopsided or unilaterally trade away deep and long-term European interests and principles. Instead, von der Leyen became a supplicant to a triumphant Trump.

The situation is reminiscent of the final rounds of the Brexit negotiations five years ago when von der Leyen similarly was giving in to unacceptable demands from Boris Johnson, only to U-turn under pressure from a steelier EU chief negotiator and a quartet of member states.

Today, von der Leyen runs Brussels with a strong presidential hand and has largely done away with internal checks and balances inside the commission. That is her prerogative and her style, but the upshot should not be weak, ineffective and unprincipled dealings on Europe’s major geopolitical challenges, from Trump to Gaza.

Vir: Georg Riekeles & Varg Folkman, The Guardian

• Georg Riekeles is a former EU official who served on the Commission’s task force for the Brexit negotiations. He is an associate director of the European Policy Centre think tank.

• Varg Folkman is a policy analyst at the European Policy Centre.