Za Rusijo, ki sile Nata v Ukrajini vidi kot eksistencialno grožnjo, kot varnostno grožnjo za obstoj Rusije, seveda politične igrice v obliki začasnega premirja, ne morejo priti v poštev. Ker za Rusijo to ni politična igrica, kot se jo igrajo ZDA od leta 2000 naprej. Minsk 1 in 2 sta dokončno razbila to iluzijo. Edina sprejemljiva rešitev za Rusijo je, da v Ukrajini, desno od Dnjepra ne bo sil in orožja Nata. Dokler ta rešitev ne bo na mizi in dokler ZDA niso sposobne vojaško premagati Rusije, se bo ta vojna nadaljevala. 

Vsak od razumnih ljudi, ki se bori za interese svoje države, bi – če bi bil na čelu Rusije – ravnal enako. In Američani to vedo od znane depeše Williama J. Burnsa, ameriškega veleposlanika v Rusiji, iz februarja 2008, ki je dva meseca pred vrhom Nata v Bukarešti, kjer sta Ukrajina in Gruzija bili navedeni v sklepnem dokumentu kot bodoči članici Nata, opozoril State department, da je to jasna “rdeča črta” tako za Putina kot za kateregakoli ruskega politika.

Izsek iz depeše: “Nyet Means Nyet: Russia’s NATO Enlargement Redlines”

Datum: 1. februar 2008

ID depeše: 08MOSCOW265_a

Pošiljatelj: Ambassador William J. Burns

Prejemnik: U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.

1. (C) Summary. Following a muted first reaction to Ukraine’s intent to seek a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest summit (ref A), Foreign Minister Lavrov and other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition, stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion as a potential military threat. NATO enlargement, particularly to Ukraine, remains “an emotional and neuralgic” issue for Russia, but strategic policy considerations also underlie strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. In Ukraine, these include fears that the issue could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene. Additionally, the GOR and experts continue to claim that Ukrainian NATO membership would have a major impact on Russia’s defense industry, Russian-Ukrainian family connections, and bilateral relations generally. In Georgia, the GOR fears continued instability and “provocative acts” in the separatist regions. End summary. MFA: NATO Enlargement “Potential Military Threat to Russia”

…

4. (U) During a press briefing January 22 in response to a question about Ukraine’s request for a MAP, the MFA said “a radical new expansion of NATO may bring about a serious political-military shift that will inevitably affect the security interests of Russia.” The spokesman went on to stress that Russia was bound with Ukraine by bilateral obligations set forth in the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership in which both parties undertook to “refrain from participation in or support of any actions capable of prejudicing the security of the other Side.” The spokesman noted that Ukraine’s “likely integration into NATO would seriously complicate the many-sided Russian-Ukrainian relations,” and that Russia would “have to take appropriate measures.” The spokesman added that “one has the impression that the present Ukrainian leadership regards rapprochement with NATO largely as an alternative to good-neighborly ties with the Russian Federation.” Russian Opposition Neuralgic and Concrete

5. (C) Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia’s influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.

6. (C) Dmitriy Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, expressed concern that Ukraine was, in the long-term, the most potentially destabilizing factor in U.S.-Russian relations, given the level of emotion and neuralgia triggered by its quest for NATO membership. The letter requesting MAP consideration had come as a “bad surprise” to Russian officials, who calculated that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations were safely on the backburner. With its public letter, the issue had been “sharpened.” Because membership remained divisive in Ukrainian domestic politics, it created an opening for Russian intervention. Trenin expressed concern that elements within the Russian establishment would be encouraged to meddle, stimulating U.S. overt encouragement of opposing political forces, and leaving the U.S. and Russia in a classic confrontational posture. The irony, Trenin professed, was that Ukraine’s membership would defang NATO, but neither the Russian public nor elite opinion was ready for that argument. Ukraine’s gradual shift towards the West was one thing, its preemptive status as a de jure U.S. military ally another. Trenin cautioned strongly against letting an internal Ukrainian fight for power, where MAP was merely a lever in domestic politics, further complicate U.S.-Russian relations now.