V vednost. O tem sosledju “učenja s trgovino”, smo nekoč pisali znanstvene članke (na to temo imam vsaj 3 znanstvene članke v tujih revijah). Podjetja, ki postanejo uspešni izvozniki, so se prej “učila” z uvozom tuje tehnologije in vmesnih proizvodov. Empirične raziskave na podjetniških podatkih na velikem vzorcu držav kažejo, da so uvozna podjetja, ki so hkrati tudi izvozniki, bolj produktivna od zgolj izvoznih podjetij. Poljudno rečeno, kasnejši uspešni izvozniki so najprej uvozili tujo tehnologijo in tuje inpute in se naučili učinkovito proizvajati z njimi za domači trg, nato začeli inovirati in se prebili na izvozne trge. Tudi slovenska ali španska podjetja (glejte denimo: Damijan, J.P., Č. Kostevc (2015), Learning from Trade through Innovation: Causal Link between Imports, Exports and Innovation in Spanish Microdata. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics).

No, kitajska podjetja so to naredila v masovnem obsegu. Vstop v WTO leta 2001 in posledično znižanje carin so izkoristila za cenejši uvoz tuje tehnologije in inputov, postala zelo učinkovita v proizvodnji in se pripravila na izvozni skok. Ter prevzela svet. Za razliko od ameriških, ki so se iz proizvodnih in izvoznih podjetij prek outsourcanja proizvodnje v tujino v želji po maksimizaciji dobičkov prelevila v uvoznike v tujini proizvedenih končnih izdelkov. Spodaj je dobra nit, kako se je Kitajska industrializirala, medtem ko se je Amerika financializirala z outsourcanjem proizvodnje v Kitajsko (in drugod), nakar je slednja začela jokati, da ni fer, da se je Kitajska tako močno industrializirala za izvoz. Spomnim se spodnjega članka s konference, kjer ga je predstavljala kolegica Deborah Swenson.

In 2016, economists studied Chinese firms and found a clear pattern. Those that imported intermediate goods were far more likely to become successful exporters.

These inputs—tools, parts, materials—helped Chinese firms raise quality, improve productivity, and compete globally. It wasn’t accidental. It was by design.

China used global trade to learn. First import. Then absorb. Then replace. Then dominate.

Across the Pacific, the US was doing the opposite. Offshoring industry. Gutting unions. Letting finance call the shots while real production withered.

China built factories. America built PowerPoints. China invested in engineers. America paid consultants.

One country doubled down on manufacturing. The other glorified asset bubbles, buybacks, and quarterly profits.

By the 2020s, China led in EVs, solar, steel, and AI chips. The US begged for fabs it once owned, offering subsidies to foreign firms.

Economists said comparative advantage would lift all boats. Instead, it sank communities and bloated Wall Street.

For China, imports were a stepping stone. For the US, they became a crutch. One turned global supply chains into weapons. The other turned them into dependencies.

The study showed that Chinese firms used imports to grow stronger. They used globalization to learn how to win.

America used globalization to forget how to build. It imported cheap goods and exported middle-class jobs.

This wasn’t inevitable. It was a policy choice. One country had a strategy. The other had slogans.

Imports made China more competitive. They made America more fragile. That’s the real story of the global economy.

Vir: William Huo