Ta izguba moči in kontrole se ni začela s Trumpom, pač pa že pred Obamo. Začela se je z vzponom Kitajske. Zgodila se je s tem, ko je Kitajska postala alternativa ZDA – s ponudbo razvojne pomoči (Belt & Road Initiative), tehnološko in gospodarsko. Ameriki je ostala le še finančna prevlada. Toda samo do trenutka, dokler ni Kitajska globalno uveljavila svojega lastnega SWIFT sistema (ki se imenuje CIPS). Sistem CIPS danes uporablja več kot 4,800 bank v 185 državah. Njegova prednost pred SWIFT je dvojna:

1. prvič, CIPS za razliko od SWIFT ne omogoča zgolj komunikacije med bankami, pač pa tudi poravnavo transakcij; in
2. drugič, komunikacija in poravnava transakcij v CIPS sistemu poteka v realnem času (7.2 sekunde), medtem ko komuniklacija v okviru SWIFT sistema traja 3 do 5 dni.

S CIPS sistemom se je mednarodna trgovina s Kitajsko dedolarizirala, vse transakcije lahko potekajo v juanih in ZDA tega ne morejo več preprečevati prek omejevanja uporabe SWIFT sistema.

Pomemben pa je še en vidik. ZDA so gospodarsko obvladovale svet tudi prek nadzora nad dostopom do velikega ameriškega trga. Na ta način so prisiljevale druge države v koncesije (kot so denimo spoštovanje ameriških avtorskih pravic ali delovnih standardov, samoomejevanje izvoza itd.). Toda tudi ta ameriška moč je sčasoma uplahnila, saj je Kitajska postala glavni trgovinski partner večine držav. Trump je to zelo boleče okusil na svoji koži v preteklih tednih, ko je poskušal na podlagi nekdanje moči izsiliti koncesije od drugih držav. Kot slikovito pravi Alan Beattie v Financial Timesu: ko je z uvedbo absurdno visokih carin državam zagrozil zgolj s palico in brez ponudbe korenčka, je boleče ugotovil, da Amerika ni več nenadomestljiva. Nobena resna trgovinska sila ni pristala na pogajanja pod temi ameriškimi grožnjami – niti ameriške de facto politične kolonije, kot so Japonska, Južna Koreja in države EU.

___________

The US has long used market access as bait for trading partners to cut tariffs, adopt US rules on intellectual property rights and so forth. Probably the last hurrah for this tactic was the painstakingly created Trans-Pacific Partnership, signed by 12 Asia-Pacific countries in 2016 and designed to encircle China with US-oriented economies.

But Congress held the agreement up before Trump pulled the US out altogether in 2017. The spurned countries went ahead and turned the TPP into the “comprehensive and progressive” CPTPP without the US, excising IP provisions that had been included at Washington’s insistence.

Since then the prospects for using the US market for leverage have shrunk, not just because of the secular decline in America’s share of the global economy but because of the toxicity of trade agreements in Washington. The Biden administration attempted to restore US influence in the Asia-Pacific with the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity”. But that merely created bemusement in the region by attempting to coax partner countries to adopt US labour standards and other rules without offering export markets in return.

Trump’s idea is to threaten to take market access away with high tariffs and then restore it in return for trade concessions. It’s all stick and no carrot. The credibility of his threat to impose permanently high import duties is subject to the whim of the financial markets, and his trustworthiness in keeping those taxes low following a deal exceedingly suspect.

In the global game of trade poker, Trump inherited a weakening hand and is playing it extremely badly. Bessent and his other officials are in a precarious position. The US does not have the aid, the technology or the market access to exert control over global trade the way it once did, and Trump’s erratic behaviour is rapidly increasing the probability that it never will.

Vir: Alan Beattie, Financial Times