Adam Tooze v Financial Timesu argumentira, da je Trumpov vandalizem sicer absolutno zavržen, vendar – kar se tiče ameriške zunanje politike – ni zgodovinsko nič novega. Trumpov vandalizem je zgolj dokončno razkril, da je Amerika že dolgo nazaj izgubila kompas in da je sledenje ameriškemu vodstvu (jaz bi temu rekel vazalna vloga ostalih zahodnih držav) dokončno zašlo v slepo ulico.

Tooze na koncu sicer argumentira, da če Evropa želi v mednarodnih odnosih imeti “na pravilih temelječ red“, mora to sama narediti. In korak v to smer vidi v nemški oziroma evropski odločitvi o oboroževanju. Pri tem pa spregleda dvoje. Prvič, da Evropa kljub še tako velikemu pritisku v smeri oboroževanja nikoli ne bo imela niti tehnološko dovolj močne niti funkcionalne homogene vojske, da bi lahko postala pomemben mednarodni dejavnik. Prej bo prišlo do rivalstva med večjimi državami EU za vodstvo, zaradi česar intenzivno oboroževanje lahko postane problem in dejavnik, ki bo brez patronata od zunaj razgnal EU. In drugič, da je Evropa v industrijskem in splošnem tehnološkem in gospodarskem zatonu, kar je primarni razlog, da se bo njena vloga pri vzpostavljanju nove mednarodne ureditve v bodoče še bolj zmanjševala in ne povečevala.

Mednarodni red postavljajo najmočnejše države, Evropa pa to ni niti v vojaškem, niti v tehnološkem, niti v gospodarskem pomenu, niti ni homogena sila s homogenimi interesi in preferencami. Evropa ne zna niti zaustaviti vojne na svojih mejah, kaj šele, da bi pisala nova globalna pravila. Ja, osamosvojitev od ZDA je korak v pravo smer, toda evropske države bodo, če bodo, to dosegle prepozno, da bi lahko sodelovale pri oblikovanju nove globalne ureditve. Postavile jo bodo ZDA, Kitajska in Rusija. Ki bodo tudi poskrbele, da pride do miru v Ukrajini. Ker EU tega zaradi svoje šibkosti ne more, niti noče.

_____________

The ambushing of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last week is driving a frantic search for historical orientation.

It was clearly more shocking than anything that occurred during Donald Trump’s first term. But is it, in its consequences, worse than the push for the global war on terror under George W Bush? Worse than Richard Nixon’s disruption of the Bretton Woods system? Or America’s outrageous bombing of Cambodia and Laos? More egregious than numerous cold war coups or the brutal bargaining that took place, admittedly behind closed doors, during the second world war?

…

Trump is the legitimate heir to a reactionary, national-populist strain that runs deep in US democracy. What is also clear, however, is that he is the most brutish, self-deluded, undignified incumbent ever to have graced the White House. What has gone wrong?

The crucial thing is that elite checks and balances have failed within the Republican party. And with no strong leftwing grassroots movement, the result of elite weakness in the US is that democracy slides towards crass populism. A large part of the US electorate will vote for anyone other than a member of the liberal elite. A smaller, but still substantial, segment positively adores Trump. Added dynamism comes from the fact that, unlike during his first term, Trump is opening the door to a new guard of younger men, represented by vice-president JD Vance and Elon Musk.

…

It has been clear for some time that the US needed a new and much more restrained formula for foreign policy.

…

Joe Biden oversaw a profoundly untimely revival of American claims to global leadership. The result was an administration that committed the US to the defence of Ukraine, backed Israeli escalation in the Middle East and engaged in brinkmanship with China. This satisfied the Washington “blob”, revived the spirits of Atlanticists and fed complacency in Europe. But despite the Biden administration’s claim to be pursuing a foreign policy for the US middle class, popular support for its approach was fragile.

Of course, Trump is a vandal. But in tearing down the status quo he does no more than confirm the obvious — that the elite coalition that favoured US global leadership has lost its political grip. If Europe wants something it likes to call a “rules-based order”, it will have to make it for itself.

At least within the compass of its own relations with the rest of the world, Europe has the means to do so and a political culture sufficiently robust to sustain it. In Berlin this week we finally heard an adequate answer, with chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz agreeing to a coalition programme that would see massive increases in defence spending. This is not a done deal and it will not save Ukraine from horrible choices. But it does offer the prospect that Europe may be able finally to move beyond its humiliating fear of Russia and dependence on a once more unreliable America.

Vir: Adam Tooze, Financial Times