Andrew Day ima zanimivo teorijo o Trumpovi enigmatski nekonsistentnosti, in sicer, da se obda s “slabimi policaji”, da bi prestrašil nasprotnike in nato lažje dosegel zmernejše cilje. Vendar tudi, če bi to bilo res, kot kaže Trumpov prvi mandat, imajo privrženci trde linije v njegovem kabinetu (kot sta bila Bolton in Pompeo) številna orodja za subvertiranje golobjih politik, ki jim nasprotujejo. In ironija je, da medtem ko Trump javno krivi globoko državo za oviranje njegove zunanjepolitične agende, pa njegova strategija obkrožanja s trdimi silami pomeni izgradnjo lastne globoke države kar znotraj Bele hiše.

Bomo videli, koliko slabša bo Trumpova zunanja politika od Bidnove (če je to sploh možno).

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When it comes to foreign policy, Donald Trump is an enigma. During presidential campaigns, he blasts neoconservatives for involving America in Forever Wars. After he’s elected president, he hires neocons and other hardliners to work in the White House. Officials who filled key roles in his first administration, and the new appointees slated to do the same in his second, read like a Who’s Who of ultra-hawkism. Different men, same story.

While all sorts of explanations for Trump’s contradictions are possible—he’s all talk, or he’s under donor pressure, or he just likes tough guys—one theory has given some advocates of foreign policy restraint (including yours truly) a measure of solace, namely, that Trump uses the hawks as a means to pursue dovish ends. Evidence for this comes from reports about how Trump in his first term liked to have a warmongering John Bolton by his side, just to scare people. “Bolton can be the bad cop and Trump can be the good cop,” one Trump official explained to Axios in 2019. “Trump believes this to his core.”

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Spodaj je dober opis, kako delujejo sodobni delniški trgi. Michael Lewis (avtor mega uspešnic Moneyball (2003), The Blind Side (2006), The Big Short (2010), ki ste jih tudi lahko videli na filmu) je o tem, da visokofrekvenčno trgovanje vodijo algoritmi in da sta pri trgovanju v milisekundah pomemebna oddalejnost od serverjev borze in hitrost internetne povezave, pisal že pred leti. Spodaj pa je še nekaj njegovih dodatnih razlag, kako je ves sistem trgovanja prirejen. Seveda v korist največjih finančnih igralcev.

Over fifteen months the Biden administration falsely claimed that it was Hamas which was blocking a deal over Gaza. It falsely claimed that it could not use any pressure against Netanyahoo to finally accept an agreement.

That was of course nonsense as it is the U.S. which was and is financing Netanyahoo’s war. 

It only took a few hours and some brashness from Donald Trump to push Netanyahoo towards concessions.

As Haaretz writes (archived):

Last Friday evening, Steven Witkoff, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, called from Qatar to tell Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aides that he would be coming to Israel the following afternoon. The aides politely explained that was in the middle of the Sabbath but that the prime minister would gladly meet him Saturday night.

Witkoff’s blunt reaction took them by surprise. He explained to them in salty English that Shabbat was of no interest to him. His message was loud and clear. Thus in an unusual departure from official practice, the prime minister showed up at his office for an official meeting with Witkoff, who then returned to Qatar to seal the deal.

Other Israeli media add:

Two officials familiar with the latest ceasefire push told The Times of Israel on Monday that Trump’s Mideast envoy held a “tense” meeting with Netanyahu on Saturday, during which the former leaned hard on the Israeli premier to accept compromises necessary to secure a hostage deal by the January 20 US presidential inauguration.

Witkoff’s pressure on Netanyahu appeared to have had an effect, with the two officials familiar with the negotiations saying that key gaps were filled in the talks over the weekend.

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From a senior US military intel officer who follows the Ukraine war professionally:

“Poland worked with the Ukrainian embassy to attempt to recruit Ukrainian men – there are currently 800,000+ Ukrainian men of conscription age in Europe – and build up multiple brigades of troops (Ukrainian men) with basic skills to go to Ukraine where they would receive advanced skills and then move to the front lines. After a recruiting campaign on all the major social media platforms across Europe, begun in early summer, only 500 men expressed interest by early November…”

“Why have 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers deserted in 3 years, compared to 16,000 Russians? Russian desertions included 9,000 in the first year, just several thousand in 2024. Ukrainian desertions include nearly 80,000 in 2024 (there is a good deal of dispute about the numbers with the lowest figure being nearly 70,000, the highest figure being just short of 200,000).”

“All said differently, support among Ukrainians for the war and the war effort is waning and many do not want to fight. Presumably they view it as a hopeless or a death sentence, or both. It raises the very real issue of what is the real morale in the Ukrainian army and are they nearing a fracture point of some sort? And this incident points out that they really don’t know how to fix it. It would seem that they need a ceasefire soon, before something breaks.”

Vir: David Goldman via X

Spodaj je izjemno dobra kritična analiza različnih komentarjev stanja v ruskem gospodarsvu, ki jo je naredil ekonomski zgodovinar Adam Tooze (Columbia University). Tooze je povzel kritične članke o alarmantnem stanju v ruskem gospodarstvu, objavljenih v zadnjih mesecih vodilnih tujih medijih in s strani različnih think-tankov, ki napovedujejo, da se ruskemu gospodarstvu zaradi visokih obrestnih mer obeta finančni kolaps in da se bo gospodarstvo sesulo kot hiška iz kart. Nato pa te kritične wishful-thinking članke primerja z bolj realističnimi članki, ki so jih napisali analitiki, ki bolje poznajo rusko gospodarstvo in institucionalno okolje. Sklep slednjih je, da se ruskemu gospodarstvu ne obeta finančni kolaps (če že, pa ga glede na izkušnje iz finančne krize leta 2008 rusko vodstvo zna dobro menedžirati), da vojaški keynesianizem v Rusiji še nekaj časa lahko deluje (deluje, ker je bilo pred tem rusko gospodarstvo celo desetletje podhranjeno in ker financiranje vojaške industrije multiplikativno pozitivno vpliva na celotno gospodarstvo), da je rusko prebivalstvo zadovoljno (ker se plače in dohodki povečujejo hitreje od inflacije) in da imajo ruske institucije dovolj manevrskega prostora (rezerve, možnosti dviga davkov), da vzdržujejo to vojno ekonomijo še nekaj časa. Sklep je, da bo Rusija najbrž deležna stagnacije nekoč, toda ne še letos ali naslednje leto.

Torej vprašanje je, kdo lahko vzdrži dlje: Rusija s svojo vojno ekonomijo ali zahodna politična vodstva pod pritiskom gospodarske stagnacije in iztekajočih se političnih mandatov?

Moje mnenje je, da definitvno dlje zdrži ruska vojna ekonomija in njeno politično vodstvo od zahodnega apetita po in sposobnosti spodbujanja nadaljevanja vojne in da se bodo problemi za Rusijo začeli pravzaprav šele po koncu vojne, ko bo nastopil mir. Kaj bo poganjalo rusko gospodaarstvo, ko ne bo več vojaškega stimulusa? Rusija ima izjemno skromen delež “civilne industrije” in se je vedno naslanjala na izvoz energentov, surovin, hrane in umetnih gnojil. Rusija nima programa za mirnodobno gospodarsko rast in razvoj. Zato bi se tisti, ki si želijo ruskega gospodarskega kolapsa, morda morali zavzemati za čim prejšnji konec vojne.

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As we approach the third anniversary of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, as the world braces for Trump’s inauguration, as the military and diplomatic balance threatens to shift against Ukraine there has been a noticeable shift amongst Western commentators on the economic front. The economy has always been counted as a strong suit for Russia. In an attritional struggle it surely had the advantage. But is that true? Is time, actually, on Russia’s side? Or is the economy perhaps the weak link in Russian strategy?

If we look at the balance between the two sides, such speculation seems implausible. Whereas, Ukraine fights to keep the lights on, Russia is still a prosperous exporter of oil and gas. All the more telling is the drum beat of questions being asked by influential Western voices.

“Here’s hoping” is how Gideon Rachman on twitter reacted to a piece by Finland’s Foreign Minister in the Economist which declared that “Time is not on Russia’s side.”

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Moj odgovor na kritike nekaterih, da ne razumem pomena praznovanja spomina na Dražgoše:

Pokopljimo mrtve, nehajmo živeti v preteklosti in se začnimo ukvarjati s prihodnostjo in razvojem.

Strinjamo se, da je Evropa na robu kolapsa oziroma je že onstran točke preloma. Tradicionalna gospodarska struktura razpada, nove pa Evropa ni sposobna izgraditi. Ni ne želje, ne vizije in ne sposobnosti, da bi naredili preboj.

Spodaj je pogled tehnološkega inovatorja, ki (tipično za tehnološke freake) težavo vidi v preveliki regulaciji in previsokih davkih. Strinjam se glede morilske regulacije v Evropi, hkrati pa menim, da je večji problem od davkov v neobstoju kapitalskega trga v Evropi, ki bi po vzoru ameriškega vlagal v startupe in prevzel rizike. Delno pa je tudi problem v evropski kulturi, ki ni nagnjena k prevzemanju tveganj, pač pa k držanju kontrole nad podjetjem. Zato 90 % financiranja evropska podjetja iščejo pri bankah, v ZDA je razmerje pol – pol. V Evropi je to no go, ker bi obstoječi lastniki tako lahko izgubili kontrolo. Problem pa je, da tak – bančni – način financiranja lahko deluje pri etabliranih podjetjih, pri startupih pa ne more, ker ti po definiciji razen nove ideje nimajo ne bilanc in ne sredstev, ki bi jih lahko zastavili za kredit. Zato pač evropski startupi vsi po vrsti zbežijo iskat kapital v ZDA. In tam ostanejo.

Nam pa ostane industrijski muzej na prostem. Lepa arhitektura iz predindustrijskega obdobja in dobra hrana.

* Aja, spodaj bodite pozorni – Lehmann je kot inovacijsko lokacijo izbral Slovenijo. Le od kod mu ta ideja?

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I’m German.

16 years ago, the EU and US economies were neck and neck.Today, the US economy is 50% larger than the entire EU combined.

Here’s the devastating truth behind Europe’s ongoing economic suicide 🧵:

First, let’s look at the numbers:• US GDP: $25.5 trillion
• EU GDP: $16.6 trillion

But in 2008, they were nearly equal.

What the hell happened over the past 16 years?

It’s simple: 

Europe chose security over growth.
America chose innovation over regulation.

The results?

America has produced 9 trillion-dollar companies (9/10 of the most valuable companies in the world).

Europe? ZERO. Nowhere to be found:

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Lepo jih je (bilo) videti vse štiri skupaj na odru. Roger Waters se je po 24 letih za nekaj koncertov pridružil ostali trojici na odru, nato so pa spet šli na dvoje. Roger Waters je napisal praktično vse pesmi, David Gilmour je prispeval muziko in glas. Ta interna dinamika med Watersom in Gilmourjem je nekako funkcionirala samo do albuma Final Cut (1983). Škoda.

Če pomislim, da sem bil v sedmem razredu osnovne šole, ko je razpadel največji bend 20. stoletja (ob Rolling Stones), ki sem ga nato še 45 let non-stop poslušal. Kdo se bo spomnil New kids on the block po 45 letih. Hej, a kdo sploh še ve, da so obstajali?

Kitajska je v globoki krizi, ki jo The Economist, Financial Times in Wall Street Journal že 25 let nekajkrat letno razglasijo. Ampak zdaj je Kitajska res pred kolapsom – njen letni zunanjetrgovinski presežek je dosegel skoraj 1,000 milijard dolarjev. Kar je znak (počakajte na pojasnila omenjenih medijev), da se kitajsko gospodarstvo obupno rešuje z izvozom, ker je domače povpraševanje na psu.

Final proof: tak je bil razvojni model Japonske, Južne Koreje in Kitajske. In kot vidite, so vse kolapsnile. Ni jih več.

Jok! Ne bo šlo. Kitajska je zdaj močnejša kot kadarkoli prej. Brez izstreljenega strela je zavzela večino sveta.