Trumpa je nemogoče imeti rad, težko je biti njegov podpornik, je pa zmešan in premočrten, zato je treba biti pripravljen na njega. V njegovem drugem mandatu bo Evropa njegova največja žrtev. S Kitajsko in Rusijo se bo dogovoril, ker imata močni vodstvi in sta podprti z jedrskim orožjem. EU je šibka, gospodarsko je na umetnem dihanju, njeno politično vodstvo je indolentno in nesposobno, in nima lastne obrambe, razen nekaj francoskih jedrskih konic je EU vojaško mrtva in neoperativna. In Trump se bo prav zaradi tega nad njo izživljal. Še posebej nad Nemčijo. EU bo prisilil, da bo plačala za obnovo Ukrajine, prisilil jo bo, da kupuje ameriški plin in prisilil jo bo, da kupuje ameriško orožje. Ker lahko.

Čeprav bo po svoje zabavno, ko bo poniževal ameriško lutko Ursulo vdL, pa ne bo zabavno, ko bomo zaradi nje in nesposobne vladajoče evropske politične garniture mi Evropejci plačevali ceno za njihovo nesposobnost. Res je skrajni čas za strategijo osamosvojitve Evrope od Amerike.

Spodaj je dober komentar Wolganga Münchaua.

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There is much complacency and wishful thinking in Europe’s discourse about Trump. When he was first elected, the Europeans did not take him seriously. Then, when they realised he was serious, they bet, correctly as it turned out, that he would be defeated at the subsequent elections. But Trump’s defeat simply returned them to the same old complacency. They may be a little less delusional about the direction of US politics after the November elections. But they still don’t have a Trump strategy.

To see what lies in store for Europe, just take a look at who will be at today’s inauguration in Washington DC. Generally considered a domestic event, foreign states are usually represented by diplomats. But in a break with tradition, Trump has invited Giorgia Meloni — the only European head of state on the guest list. Nigel Farage will also be there, and Tino Chupralla, the co-leader of the Alternative for Germany. Éric Zemmour will come from France. Most of the European attendees are leaders of far-Right parties, with a few representatives of other political groups — mostly on the Right — and assorted ambassadors. Trump’s relationship with Europe is not one of a transatlantic alliance of countries, but of parties.

For the Italian Prime Minister, the election of Trump is a lucky break. EU leaders committed a big error when they side-lined her last summer to hand Ursula von der Leyen a second term as president of the European Commission. They did what they always do — formed a coalition among each other without thinking strategically. They had a nominal majority and did not need Meloni’s support. She was blindsided in the unedifying Brussels jobs carousel. In stark contrast, Trump, has called her a great leader and treats her with a respect she does not receive in the EU.

She also has a close relationship with Elon Musk. If she goes ahead buys into Musk’s Starlink satellite system for secure government communications it would be a significant blow for the EU, which is trying to develop its own competing system. I expect to see more bilateral deals with the US that will end up undermining common European projects.

Trump will not struggle to find other ways to divide the Europeans. Take selective tariffs, for example. He cannot single out individual countries, because the EU is a customs union. But he can pick sectors. If he goes after cars, naturally it will be the Germans who will be hit the hardest.

He didn’t start an all-out trade war during his first term. But this time, things are looking more threatening. American media recently reported that Trump and his economics team were considering declaring a state of economic emergency. While this might sound ridiculous, given the strong US growth rates, there is a legal basis for him to do so. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, signed into law by Jimmy Carter in 1977, allows US presidents to impose sanctions on countries to protect US national security interests. Carter used it in 1979, when he ordered the freeze of all Iranian government assets in the US after the Iranian hostage crisis. Joe Biden more recently used it to impose sanctions on Russia. But it’s not beyond the bounds of possibility that Trump could use these sweeping powers in an unorthodox fashion: for tariffs, bypassing the traditional routes of US trade law. Yes, you can be a dictator, legally, and for more than a day.

His priority, as his term begins, will to be reverse the offshoring of sectors he and his team deem critical to US national security, such as rare earths or batteries. While German cars may not be on that particular list, I expect he will give the Germans and the other Europeans a painful transactional choice: either suffer tariffs, or agree to offsetting purchases of US gas and military equipment. Both would be nails in the coffin of the German economic model. The first would lead to more offshoring, as German companies will shift production to the US. The second would make Germany reliant on ever more expensive energy. The forced purchase of US defence equipment, meanwhile, would come at the expense of domestic manufacturers, such as Rheinmetall. It would surely have made more sense for the Europeans to build their own defence industry, but that would have required a strategic foresight that Merkel lacked.

Germany offends Trump on so many levels: the trade surpluses; the low defence spending and the reliance on the US for security; the transition to Green energy and the abolition of nuclear power; immigration policies; and pretty much everything Merkel ever did. He will also certainly remember being laughed at by German diplomats at the UN when he correctly pointed out the geopolitical danger of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline connecting Russia and Germany. Trump was also right when he said the Germans build excellent machines, and yet their armed forces are an under-invested shambles. I think he is right, too, when he complains about Germany’s notorious trade surpluses, which are mistaken for economic strength. Germany was still considered a global economic power-house when Trump first came to office eight years ago. Today, he sees it as an economic basket case. He is not wrong.

Apart from forcing Germany to pay for its own defence, he will also tell them to take a leadership role in Ukraine. Germany won’t want to rise to the occasion, not even under a conservative leader such as Merz. But whether or not Trump succeeds in imposing a peace deal on Russia and Ukraine, it will be the Europeans, and the Germans especially, who will have to pay. The Germans have the strictest fiscal rules in the world, and the largest volume of unfunded projects. Despite what they say, they are not ready to plug the gap left by America.

For while Trump is not the cause of Germany’s weakness, he exposes it like nobody before. And Germany has only itself to blame for its weakness: it chose not to reform its economic models. And it chose not to invest in defence. You do not have to be a Trump supporter to conclude that on the specific bilateral disputes Trump had with Germany, Trump was right, and Germany was wrong.

But the biggest threat to Germany’s governing elites is Trump’s and Musk’s ongoing support for the AfD, a party that advocates a withdrawal from the EU and the euro, and a policy of reversing immigration flows. Musk’s endorsement of the party on X had an immediate effect on its polling. While the AfD is not about to win the elections, the presence of Trump and his continued support would give them a credible path to power.

Trump won’t destroy the EU in a formal sense. He won’t leave Nato either. But he is going to deconstruct the post-war European order in many subtle and not so subtle ways. And he will bring down the perma-coalition of Europe’s centrists which has been running the EU uninterrupted from its inception.

They are the people who are clinging on to their own World of Yesterday. They are the political establishment. They will not be alright.

Vir: Wolgang Münchau, UnHerd