Izjemno dober komentar Johna Burna Murdocha v Financial Timesu je pokazal na novo dimenzijo razumevanja problema padajoče rodnosti. Pokazal je, da gre problem padajoče rodnosti z roko v roki z naraščajočo preferenco po samskosti. Padec rodnosti po vsem svetu ni posledica manjšega števila otrok na par, temveč občutnega zmanjšanja števila ljudi v razmerju. Njegovi podatki za številne (razvite in nerazvite) države kažejo izjemno visioko korelacijo med stopnjo rodnosti in deležem samskih. Torej, ker ljudje trendno izgubljajo željo po “parjenju” (življenju v paru), naj bi se trendno zmanjševala tudi rodnost.

Trend je globalen, z nekaj izjemami (Južna Azija). Murdoch poskuša najti povezavo med med manjšo željo po parjenju z naraščajočo uporabo pametnih telefonov. Slednji naj bi zmanjševali željo po druženju, hkrati naj bi omogočili širjejnje liberalnih vrednot med ženskami prek družbenih omrežij. V Južni Aziji naj bi se tradicionalne vrednote bolj ohranile zaradi manjšega dostopa do interneta, zato je ta trend manj močan.

Zanimivo je tudi, da je ta trend sicer povezan z izobrazbo, vendar drugače, kot smo mislili do sedaj. Do sedaj je veljalo prepričanje, da je trend padajoče rodnosti posledica trendno višje stopnje izobrazbe žensk. Vendar pa podatki kažejo, da naj bi bil trend manjše stopnje parjenja bolj izrazit med manj izobraženimi (zaradi manjše samozavesti pri iskanju partnerja).

Spodaj je nit na podlagi tega komentarja s ključnimi slikami in poudarki. V posebnem komentarju sledijo podatki za Slovenijo, ki odstopajo od teh.

Coupling and Fertility are Falling.

In Finland, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and the US, both are going down.

From the 1960s, US fertility fell primarily due to fewer births AMONG COUPLES.

In that context, pro-natal bonuses might raise fertility.

But today, the major contributing factor is FEWER COUPLES.

But a weakness to the debate — perhaps even the term “birth rates” itself — is that it implies the goal is the same today as it was in the past: finding ways to encourage couples to have more children. A closer look at the data suggests a whole new challenge.

Take the US as an example. Between 1960 and 1980, the average number of children born to a woman halved from almost four to two, even as the share of women in married couples edged only modestly lower. There were still plenty of couples in happy, stable relationships. They were just electing to have smaller families.

But in recent years most of the fall is coming not from the decisions made by couples, but from a marked fall in the number of couples. Had US rates of marriage and cohabitation remained constant over the past decade, America’s total fertility rate would be higher today than it was then.

The central demographic story of modern times is not just declining rates of childbearing but rising rates of singledom: a much more fundamental shift in the nature of modern societies.

Slurs of “childless cat ladies” usually target female graduates.

But actually the real decline is happening among people with less education.

Coupling is declining in East Asia, Latin America, and most severely in the Middle East and North Africa.

What explains this global trend and regional differences?

This global decline in couple formation perfectly coincides with the rise in smart phones.

Why an almost worldwide decline, and why now? The fact that this is happening almost everywhere all at once points more to broad changes acting across borders than country-specific factors. The proliferation of smartphones and social media has been one such exogenous shock. Geographical differences in the rise of singledom broadly track mobile internet usage, particularly among women, whose calculus in weighing up potential partners is changing. This is consistent with research showing social media facilitates the spread of liberal values (notably only among women) and boosts female empowerment.

The fall in coupling is deepest in extremely-online Europe, east Asia and Latin America, followed by the Middle East and then Africa. Singledom remains rare in south Asia, where women’s web access is more limited. This is not to overstate the role of social media. Other cultural differences between countries and regions mediate both the spread of liberal ideals and people’s ability to act on them.

2 hypotheses:

1) Phones are distracting, people socialise less.

2) Women are ‘culturally leapfrogging’, exploring new ideas & raising their expectations.

But why are marriage rates still high in South Asia?

2 hypotheses:

1) Caste & kinship networks are secured through marriage, which remains vital for status and social inclusion. Singledom is stigmatised.

A littany of relatives ask, “When are you getting married?”

2) South Asia has a very large gender gap in mobile phone ownership.

This inhibits women’s cultural leapfrogging.

But while the specific mechanisms are up for debate, the proliferation of singledom and its role in cratering birth rates shows that while financial incentives and other policy tweaks can nudge birth rates higher, they are labouring against much stronger sociocultural forces. Policies aimed at facilitating relationship formation might be more effective than those aimed at helping couples have babies.

Vir: John Burn Murdoch, Financial Times & Alice Evans via X