Last March, Saudi Arabia signed, with Chinese mediation, a memorandum of understanding with Iran. Many observers considered this memorandum a concession by Riyadh in the face of the Iranian rise, which was at its peak in the Middle East. This understanding coincided with the Iranian axis’ announcement of the so-called ‘Unity of Fronts’ strategy. Today, in light of regional changes and the Iranian decline, it seems that the Middle East has entered into a competition between three projects, one of which aims to maintain the previous equation before the October 7 attack, and two of them want a new Middle East of their own. A geopolitical reading of the Middle East today.

On January 15, 2016, the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran entered into force. This agreement was not a set of technical provisions that temporarily limited Tehran’s ability to produce a nuclear bomb only, but rather an international concession that gave Khamenei’s regime a green light to expand its influence and control over the Middle East, starting with supporting the Assad regime to control the city of Aleppo, through blackmailing Saudi Arabia with missiles from the Houthi militia from Yemen, up to the attacks of October 7. Today, it can be said that the understandings of the JCPOA agreement, in its regional aspect, have ended by a decision from Israel after Trump ended its economic aspect in his first term.

Little by little, two projects began to emerge in the Middle East to reap the benefits of the decline of the Iranian project. The first is the New Middle East Project, which Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to, and the second is the political Islam project, which is managed by Türkiye and was launched with the start of the Arab Spring, then temporarily subsided, only to return today with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, but in a new, more pragmatic form. Has the Iranian project ended, and what is the nature of Turkish-Iranian relations and Turkish-Israeli relations in light of these changes?

First of all, it can be said that the Iranian regime today has begun to reshuffle its cards internally, regionally and internationally in the hope of preserving some of the influence they have been able to achieve in the region. Here, it is necessary to return to my previous thread in which I explain the latest movements of the Iranian regime. While Israel was at the top of the list of enemies in the official Iranian media close to the regime, Türkiye has recently taken its place, especially with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which requires us to take a look at Turkish-Iranian relations.

Away from the smiles and protocols between the politicians of the two countries, Ankara and Tehran do not agree on many regional issues. In Iraq, Turkish bases have witnessed over the past years repeated attacks carried out by Iraqi militias supported by Iran, as the two countries compete to impose their influence in northern Iraq, which is considered a strategic and oil-rich region, while Türkiye supports groups affiliated with the Turkmen minority, deploys several military bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and Nineveh Governorate and has important relations with some Kurdish and Arab parties. Tehran considers this Turkish influence a threat to their project of complete control over Erbil. Historically, the IRGC and the Kurdish PKK organization have mutual relations and interests, and Ankara considers these relations a threat to its national security. Therefore, the Turks will be the first to work to fill the Iranian vacuum if Baghdad witnesses a coup against Iranian influence there.

In Syria, Tehran considers Ankara to be the direct cause of the fall of the Assad regime through their support for the armed Syrian opposition, while Türkiye believes that Iran was behind Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to meet with Erdogan and open the door to normalization with Damascus. Today, Türkiye is the first to visit Damascus and the most encouraged to build diplomatic, military and security relations with the new Syrian administration. In Lebanon, Türkiye has been able in recent years to take advantage of the vacuum left by the Saudi withdrawal from the political scene in Beirut by building relations with Sunni political figures who are considered opponents of the Hezbollah militia and Iranian influence in Lebanon.

In my opinion, the file of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations is the most sensitive for the Iranian regime. Iranian officials considered the achievements made by Baku in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war a threat to Iran’s national security. This fear is not only related to the importance of Iranian-Armenian relations and the important Israeli military support for Azerbaijan, but also to Iran’s internal security, as they believe that any popular events inside the country will make the provinces of West and East Azerbaijan, which are adjacent to the state of Azerbaijan, the first to demand separation from Tehran and joining Baku. Therefore, by reading the files of the region, it can be said that the Turkish project poses a greater threat to the Iranian project for many Iranian observers and politicians than Israel. But does the Turkish project fit into the new Israeli Middle East?

Despite the hostile statements exchanged between Turkish and Israeli officials, these may be an unimportant detail in the big picture of the Middle East. The new Israeli Middle East, as we see it today, is based primarily on undermining the Iranian project in the region (which also serves Türkiye), then expanding the path of normalization with Arab countries that was frozen with Trump’s loss in the 2020 elections. Today, with Trump’s victory in the American presidential elections, it can be said that this path will be put back to track, and Riyadh will be at the top of the list through the Yemeni window. Saudi Arabia and Israel are harmed by the Houthis’ control of Sanaa, and thus the cooperation of the two countries to end this militia in Yemen will pave the way for normalizing relations, encouraging more Arab and Islamic countries to normalize relations with Israel.

Unlike the Iranian expansionist project, which was built on dreams of the return of the Persian Empire, the hostility against Israel’s existence, the restriction of Turkish influence, and the suppression of Sunni states in the region, the Turkish and Israeli projects meet at several points, the most important of which is relations with Azerbaijan, and differ at several points, the most important of which are the Palestinian and Kurdish files. With the Iranian decline, Turkish and Israeli officials will soon find themselves facing a new reality. Either these two projects will compete for influence in the region or cooperate. In my opinion, Trump’s policy in the Middle East is what will determine the shape of Turkish-Israeli relations on the one hand and the shape of the new Middle East on the other.

Vir: Eva J. Koulouriotis via X