…azijske države vsako leto v omrežje vključijo 1,000 novih elektrarn na premog. Naše izpuste CO2 lahko zmanjšamo na ničlo in gremo z gospodarstvom nazaj v srednji vek, pa ne bomo za planet naredili nič.
Zakaj torej z lastnimi ukrepi uničujemo sami sebe?
Moj komentar na komentar Roberta Wrighta (spodaj) je, da so množični družbeni mediji (enako kot forumi) odraz naše kulture komuniciranja. Kadarkoli daste ljudem možnost, da prosto komentirajo, dobite pač cel spekter njihovih komentarjev na osnovi mnenj in osebne kulture celotne družbene palete posameznikov. In ta “plebejska” raven komuniciranja “plebsa” pač izobraženi eliti ni in ne more biti všeč. V času tradicionalnih tiskanih in digitalnih medijev je bilo mnenje “plebsa” strogo moderirano in tega širokega spektra njegovih mnenj ni bilo mogoče videti ali prebrati. Na odprtih družbenih medijih, dostopnih vsem, jih pač vidimo v vsej njihovi širini (ali bedi). Zato Blueskyju sledi ista usoda kot je Twitterju (X). Razen seveda, če ga bodo “zaprli” samo za “elito” oziroma filtrirali (cenzurirali). Ampak potem ne bo dosegel množičnosti in ne bo postal donosen za lastnike. Zakaj bi vlagali v nedonosne projekte? Torej…
Princeton psychologist Molly Crockett, who studies the dynamics of social media, took to Bluesky this week to argue that the recent exodus of liberals from X (aka Twitter) could be good for American democracy.
Crockett’s case focuses on what she views as X’s bread and butter: spreading outrage. “Twitter makes money by keeping you online, and a reliable way to do that is to make you outraged and train you to create content that makes others outraged,” she wrote.
But will Bluesky really wind up being much less, or any less, tribalizing than Twitter? A cursory glance at our own feeds suggests that anger-inducing content on Bluesky is alive and well.
Kriminal zaradi zapiranja TEŠ6 bo bistveno večji kot pri njegovi gradnji. Tam smo govorili o nekaj sto milijonih evrov (in dobili nazaj najmanj polovico od Alstoma), pri zapiranju pa govorimo o nekaj milijardah. Minister za finance govori celo o 5 milijardah stroškov za zapiranje TEŠ6 in rudnika Velenje. Toda pravi kriminal je nekje drugje: kriminal je v zapiranju elektrarne, ki proizvede četrtino slovenske elektrike (in bi jo lahko proizvajala še desetletje in pol po konkurenčni ceni brez upoštevanja nesmiselnih CO2 kuponov) in v uvažanju nadomestne električne energije (iz plina ali premoga!) po višji ceni. V tem procesu bodo zaslužili zgolj trgovci z električno energijo. Maks Tajnikar jih je identificiral brez dlake na jeziku:
Nekateri potrebujejo psihiatra, in ne sedanje službe. Z vlado, ki mi daje subvencije za električne avte in prepoveduje uporabo električnih bojlerjev, mora biti nekaj hudo narobe.
Kako prozorni in skoraj neverjetni morajo biti interesi, da iz temeljnih elektroproizvodnih zmogljivosti želiš izdvojiti objekt, ki lahko Sloveniji daje vsaj 25 odstotkov elektrike? Če nekdo praktično že jutri radikalno omeji sodelovanje te elektrarne v proizvodnji elektrike in lahko izgubi do 25 odstotkov doma proizvedene elektrike, ki jo mora nadomestiti, to pa celo v več kot desetletju lahko naredi le z uvozom, se moraš vprašati o zdravi pameti odločevalcev. V prihodnjih desetletjih ta elektrarna nima nobene alternative, razen uvoza elektrike. Ker pa je možnost uvoza odvisna od energetskih in vse bolj tudi političnih dogajanj v drugih državah, se s tem Slovence čez noč postavi v odvisnost od drugih držav in jih naredi za njim podrejene reveže. Zato je odločitev o krčenju proizvodnje v tej elektrarni za Slovence kriminal, z vidika interesov pa korupcija.
Če zmanjšaš proizvodnjo in jo nadomestiš z uvozom, so edini, ki profitirajo, uvozniki. Od tam pa prihajajo predsedniki vlade in ministri, pa tudi sedanji proizvajalci elektrike postajajo vse bolj trgovci, primerni za privatizacijo, saj državna lastnina trgovcev res ni strateški cilj nasploh.
Ali potem pamet inženirjev v tem primeru zasenči korupcija? Ne morem verjeti, da ljudsko pamet in razum prepričaš o smiselnosti zapiranja te elektrarne. V svetu je več kot 1500 termoelektrarn, samo Kitajska jih ima več kot 1300 in na primer Poljska več kot 40, mi pa v veliki odvisnosti od nje rešujemo svet z eno, za katero zlahka rečemo, da jo imamo zaradi elektrike, in ne zaradi profitov. A elektrarna je visokodonosna, če ne upoštevamo neumnih emisijskih kuponov, ki kaznujejo nas, potrošnike, ki na obstoj elektrarn sploh ne moremo vplivati. In inženirji kar soglašajo s tem kriminalom, skuhanim v evropskih krogih. Premog je v svetu edini energent, ki ga je v presežkih in ga ne bo prav hitro zmanjkalo. In seveda, če elektrarna ne dela, se večajo njeni povprečni fiksni stroški ter njena stroškovna cena. Ne verjamem, da je razumen inženir sposoben sprejeti naslednji scenarij: umikajmo TEŠ 6 iz proizvodnje, večajmo stroškovno ceno, potem pa vpijmo, da ustvarja izgube tudi brez emisijskih kuponov.
Da, pri TEŠ 6 gre za kriminal in korupcijo, ki jo izvaja vlada. Zakaj ste inženirji kar tiho ali pa ste celo sostorilci?
Vir: Maks Tajnikar, Objektiv
Revija Nature je objavila članek, kjer poskuša revidirati evropski Green Deal, gelde na yo, da so se okoliščine po njegovem sprejemu bistveno spremenile. Specifično, avtorji pravijo, (1) predpostavka, da bodo vse države sodelovale pri uvedbi ogljičnega davka se ni uresničila, izvaja ga samo EU; (2) po začetku energetske krize in izbruha inflacije so se obrestne mere zelo povečale, javni dolgovi držav pa se po pandemiji in energetski krizi močno povečali, in (3) geopolitična situacija se je zaradi geostrateške tehnološke vojne drastčno spremenila – Kitajska in ZDA subvencionirata razvoj novh “čistih” tehnologij, ki pa so v osnovi zelo umazane (proizvodnja baterij in panelov ter proizvodnja energije za njihovo proizvodnjo), medtem ko se EU foikusira brezogljične cilje in v procesu z visokimi ofljičnimi davki in cenami energije ubija konkurenčnost svoje industrije. Nature:
The Green Deal was predicated on three presumptions, each of which has not been borne out.
First, it was widely expected that a global carbon tax would emerge, and it has not. Most economists view carbon taxation as the optimal policy for pushing carbon-intensive industries to lower their emissions2. Carbon taxes also bring in revenue to help finance the green transition. Yet Europe now stands alone in implementing carbon pricing on a large scale.
…
However, most countries worldwide do not levy carbon taxes. And those that do put a relative value of at most a few dollars on each tonne of emitted carbon dioxide equivalent, once they have corrected for the many firms that are exempted. That low value doesn’t reflect the real damage done, now and in the future — the ‘social cost of carbon’3.
Why has carbon taxation not taken off? International coordination of climate policies has fallen victim to geopolitical fragmentation and technological rivalry. The United States and China are competing fiercely over green technologies — each has issued massive subsidies for research and development (R&D) and manufacturing in areas such as batteries, solar panels and wind power.
…
Second, the Green Deal was designed and adopted at a time when long-term interest rates were historically low or even negative in real terms, and when levels of public debt were moderate. These economic conditions were conducive to financing the massive investments necessary to accomplish the transition to net zero, especially electrification. The aim was also to extend financial support to help European populations to bear the early costs of the green transition4.
However, the post-pandemic environment is very different. Public debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has soared in most advanced and European economies to more than 80%, on average. Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Belgium have public-debt-to-GDP ratios of more than 100%. This will limit the possibilities for helping households to absorb the costs of the transition, and will force careful selection of public and green investments.
Third, geopolitical trends challenge the Green Deal. As currently designed, the deal impedes European competitiveness by increasing the cost of energy substantially, mainly to cover the cost of building infrastructure around renewables and decommissioning those around fossil fuels. Europe also depends heavily on external suppliers for ‘critical minerals’ — sources of elements such as lithium and cobalt — for renewable energy and other green technologies.
Like the United States, Europe is facing challenges from China — which has control of 60–80% of the world’s production and processing of critical minerals. China is also the biggest emitter of CO2, the largest producer of coal-based electricity and the world leader in batteries and electric vehicles. China’s strategy is to act as a monopolist with low pricing, undercutting others.
Zanimivo branje:
I’ve fought in #Syria for half a decade—as an SDF soldier. In that time, I studied war, drew battle plans, and learned to know my enemy. When HTS seized their first village, I saw what few others could. Take a peek at what’s coming next—a 🧵
1/ Assad’s forces are done. Homs is indefensible—his best troops were in Hama, and when the time came for close quarters urban combat, they folded. SAA must retreat now, taking forces and materiel to the Nusayriyah Mountains to their last defensible line.
2/ If they don’t move soon, they risk losing both troops and resources they can’t afford to replace. Tartus is non-negotiable for the regime—it’s home to Russia’s naval base, the only reason Assad is still in power.
Spodaj je zgodba v 11 slikah o kitajskem sistematičnem prevzemanju sveta v zadnjih treh desetletjih. In to, za razliko od ZDA, brez da bi ji bilo treba postavljati vojaške baze po svetu, brez da bi se vmešavala v politične procese znotraj držav, brez da bi poskušala vplivati na izide volitev, brez da bi orkestrirala politične prevrate in brez da bi napadla katero državo. Strategija Kitajske je bila zelo preprosta, vendar sistematična:
Slika 1: Kitajska vlaganja v raziskave in razvoj (Kitajska v. ZDA)
Nemška poslovna morala (sentimenti) je na psu. Kot ugotavlja anketa nemške zbornice za trgovino in industrijo, tako slabo v nemčiji ni bilo še nikoli. in kriza še kar traja in ji ni videti konca niti naslednje leto. Glavna faktorja sta visoke cene energije zaradi vojne v Ukrajini in nekonkurenčnost na kitajskem trgu zaradi tehnološkega zaostanka. Vendar naročila zaradi stagnacije padajo tudi na domačem trgu. Cela situacija izgkeda kot spirala smrti navzdol.
Only 19 percent of companies rate their current situation as “good,” while 35 percent describe it as “bad.” The balance has dropped by 11 points to minus 16 points, well below the long-term average of plus 21 points.
“We last saw such a situation 20 years ago, during the severe crisis in 2002 and 2003. This is a clear alarm signal,” warned Wansleben. “At that time, the government sought to address the crisis with the Agenda 2010 reforms. We need deep reforms now as well.”
DAMIJAN blog 
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