Upajmo, da je to zadnji Silvester, ki ga bodo prebivalci Ukrajine preživljali v vojni. Upajmo, da se vojna v Ukrajini v naslednjem letu konča. Vendar to ni gotovo. Gotovo je le, da je Rusija prevladala v vojni proti Natu na ozemlju Ukrajine in da je zahodnim državam in ne Rusiji zmanjkalo denarja (in apetita) za nadaljevanje financiranja vojne. In Rusiji se nikamor ne mudi, saj z vojno izčrpava zahodne države, dokler ne bo njihovo prebivalstvo toliko utrujeno od financiranja te vojne, da bodo izvolili nova vodstva, ki ne bodo imela želje nadaljevati te vojne. V ZDA se je to že zgodilo. Kmalu se bo tudi v Nemčiji in Franciji.

Prejkoslej bo prišlo do diplomatske rešitve. Kako bo ta izgledala, je tudi v grobem jasno. Rusija bo obdržala zasedena ozemlja, okrog nove mejne črte se bo oblikovalo demilitarizirano območje, ki bo tako globoko, da Ukrajina ne bo mogla z raketami srednjega dosega doseči ruskega ozemlja. Sankcije proti Rusiji bodo ukinjene. Ukrajina bo ostala izven Nata in morda bo dobila zagotovila, da bo na ozemlju levo od Dnjepra lahko namestila zahodno orožje. Morda. Odvisno od tega, koliko bo Putin pripravljen popustiti za sprostitev sankcij.

Toda, kaj po tem? Wolfgang Münchau (nekdanji urednik Financial Timesa za Nemčijo, sedaj urednik Eurointelligence  in avtor nedavno objavljene knjige “Kaput” o propadu nemškega gospodarstva) je v komentarju v New Statesman zapisal, da se tukaj problemi za Ukrajino in njene podpornice šele začenjajo. Kdo bo plačal obnovo Ukrajine? ZDA niso pripravljene, in pod Trumpom bodo še manj, financirati proračunske luknje in obnove Ukrajine. Evropske države pa tega niso sposobne. Večina EU držav se sooča s stagnacijo ali recesijo in z visokimi proračunskimi deficiti ter zahtevami po zniževanju deficitov in dolga v novem finančnem okviru (novem fiskalnem pravilu). EU države prav gotovo ne bodo pripravljene najeti skupnega EU dolga (izdati evroobveznic) za financiranje obnove Ukrajine. In na koncu se bo postavila preprosta dilema: financiranje Ukrajine ali financiranje domače socialne države.

Kaj mislite, za kaj se bodo odločili evropski volilci?

Tragedija je, da so ameriški in evropski politiki Ukrajino zvlekli v to vojno s spodbujanjem nerealnih pričakovanj in da jo bodo na koncu zapustili kot garjavega psa.

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I am hopeful that the war could end in 2025, but a peace process would be subject to several risks. The hard part is not the main deal. The frontline will act as the de-facto border. The two sides might trade off land. What the ultimate demarcation line is agreed upon, there would be a demilitarised zone on either side. There have been reports that France’s Emmanuel Macron proposed 40,000 Nato peacekeeping troops, to be stationed along the demilitarised zone. Any credible security guarantee, short of Nato membership, would have to include such guarantees. It is not clear that Nato member states are ready for this.

Putin will almost surely demand an unfreezing of Russia’s reserve assets. This is a potential deal breaker for the Europeans. Unwilling to make any fiscal sacrifices for Europe, the Europeans had been hoping to plunder the $300bn pot of Russian reserve assets for military help and for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Putin will also demand the lifting of western sanctions. I struggle to see how there can be a peace deal without the full lifting of all sanctions, and especially the unfreezing of the assets.

And then what? Trump does not want to pay for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Nor does he want to dispatch US troops. This will leave the Europeans in charge of a task for which they are financially, militarily and politically unprepared. The financial burden is so large that it would either have to be funded through debt, through taxes, or through cuts in social services. I don’t think the Europeans would voluntarily agree to do any of these things. The trade-off between spending for Ukraine, and social spending at home has already become an issue in German politics. Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, is basing his re-election campaign on fears of an escalation of the war. Macron would, if left alone, be one west Europe’s most effective supporters of Ukraine, but he is hampered by the political chaos in his own country – for which he himself is responsible when he called elections earlier this year. There is not much scope for increased spending for Ukraine anywhere. The UK does not have any fiscal capacity either. Germany does, but has made so many commitments already, that it is hard to see where the money is coming from. 

The West’s Ukraine strategy is clearly not working. I realised this very early on when the EU and the US agreed a sanctions package full of holes — designed not to inflict maximum damage on Russia, but avoiding pain for ourselves. Europe was dependent on Russian gas and oil. Some of these dependencies persist to this day.

The biggest shift that took place was without a doubt the US elections. Until this year, Congress agreed to fund Ukraine, but earlier this month the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives rejected a proposal by the Biden administration for an additional $24 billion in aid for Ukraine. This is it. There will be no more US money. It is the West, not Russia, that is running out of money — or a willingness to spend it on Ukraine.

A deal to freeze the conflict around current battle lines would be the best outcome for Ukraine, given the circumstances. I am hopeful, but not certain that it will happen. It would require some deft diplomacy by Trump’s foreign policy team.

We should perhaps stop for a moment to reflect on this last point. We have put ourselves into a position where Trump is our best hope to end the conflict. How did it come to this?

Vir: Wolfgang Münchau, New Statesman