Ključno vprašanje je, ali bi se Kitajska tudi brez ameriških sankcij tehnološko osamosvojila. Scott Kennedy v Foreign Affairs trdi, da ne. Kitajska je bilo prvotno zadovoljna s tekmovanjem pri ostalih proizvodih. Do tega, da mora postati tehnološko neodvisna od ZDA, so jo prisilile ameriške sankcije. Podobno velja glede trgovine nasploh. Kitajska je bila zadovoljna z globalno multilateralno ureditvijo trgovine po pravilih WTO, Trumpove in Bidnove carine in negotovost oziroma nevarnost, da jo lahko Amerika kadarkoli s carinami ali sankcijami odreže od ameriškega in evropskega trga, je Kitajsko prisililo, da prestrukturira trgovinske tokove v smeri BRICS oziroma držav globalnega juga. Oboje je Kitajsko samo še bolj tehnološko, gospodarsko in politično ojačalo in jo predestiniralo za bodočo vodilno globalno silo.

This is a good read by @KennedyCSIS in ForeignAffairs on “how America’s war on Chinese tech backfired”. Kennedy essentially makes the point, as was all too predictable, that far from hampering China’s tech development efforts, US sanctions actually ended up: 1) “turbo-boosting” China’s technological ambitions and pace of innovation, and 2) damaging U.S. innovation capacity by reducing R&D revenue for US firms, restricting scholarly cooperation, and limiting access to talented Chinese researchers and students.

In short, exactly the contrary of what was intended…

Looking into the details:

Kennedy dispels the oft-repeated Washington mantra that China would have pursued such ambitious technological self-reliance and domestic innovation anyway. He writes that “the answer is an emphatic ‘no.'” He says that whilst China had goals for technological advancement with programs like “Made in China 2025”, it was specifically the U.S. restrictions that caused Beijing to shift its focus from merely raising the prominence of its tech products in global markets, towards now achieving near complete technological independence across all tech sectors.

He writes that the “restrictions on U.S. innovation” placed by the sanctions on China “outweigh the good that has come from investments” like the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. These investments total over $600 billion but Kennedy argues the negative impact of export controls has been greater – reducing business opportunities and R&D revenue for U.S. semiconductor firms, diminishing scholarly cooperation, depriving American universities of talented Chinese students in science and technology, and causing many companies globally to seek alternatives to U.S. technology.

Looking forward, Kennedy writes that “if the Trump administration takes even more radical steps to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies, the economic and national security downsides will be even more pronounced”. He warns that such a pursuit would likely result in “an isolated, poorer, and weaker United States.” He advocates for a “middle-path” of working with multilateral institutions to set new rules for global economic activity, rather than pursuing unilateral actions.

Vir: Arnaud Bertrand via X