Tale komentar Thomasa Fazija je blizu temu, kar sem pisal včeraj, in sicer, da izvolitev Trumpa daje priložnost Evropi, da se osamosvoji od ZDA. Fazi dobro sklepa, da se utegne Trumpova ideja, da bo na hitro končal vojno v Ukrajini sfižiti. Trump in ZDA si ne morejo privoščiti, da bi Rusiji preveč popustili, zato bo Trump Rusiji predlagal rešitve, ki so zanjo iz strateškega vidika nesprejemljive. Predlog, ki je pricurljal v javnost, naj bi šel v smeri, (1) da se Ukrajina zaveže, da 20 let ne bo vstopila v Nato, (2) na zdajšnji frontni črti se oblikuje demilitarizirano območje, in (3) ZDA z namenom varnostnih garancij Ukrajini še naprej zagotavljajo vojaško pomoč. Putin in Rusija na tak predlog ne moreta pristati, saj s tem Rusija ni dosegla osnovnega cilja svoje vojaške operacije v Ukrajini, torej trajne nevtralnosti in vojaške ošibitve Ukrajine, da ta s pomočjo orožja Nata ne bi mogla ogrožati varnostnih interesov Rusije. In ker Rusija zmaguje v tej vojni, Rusija na ta predlog ne more pristati. Posledično bi se ZDA utegnile umakniti iz te godlje, ki so jo zakuhale pred letom 2022 z vabljenjem Ukrajine v Nato, in prevaliti breme vojaškega podpiranja nadaljevanja vojne v Ukrajini na evropske države. ZDA bi se s tem znebile finančnega bremena, Evropa pa bi ob nadaljevanju gospodarske stagnacije prevzela še polno breme financiranja Ukrajine. V to smer so včeraj razmišljali nemški politiki, ko so predlagali, da naj bi evropske države of ZDA kupovale orožje, da bi ga nato pošiljale v Ukrajino.

Seveda gre za nonsens in popolni gospodarski samomor Evrope, saj bi Evropa ostala trajno odrezana od poceni energentov in s tem obsojena na deindustrializacijo in gospodarsko depresijo, hkrati pa bi si nakopala še za okrog 1 % BDP letnih izdatkov za financiranje vojne v Ukrajini. Le kakšno korist bi Evropa lahko imela od te “rešitve”?!

No, tukaj nastopi trenutek za razum, ko bo vse večjemu številu evropskih politikov kliknilo v možganih, da z vojno v Ukrajini izgubljata samo Ukrajina in Evropa, vsi ostali pa imajo od tega koristi, in da je treba z vojno in sankcijami na uvoz energentov čim prej končati. Ta Trumpov izolacionizem je lahko tisti trigger, ki bo Evropo prisilil, da se začne spraševati o lastnih interesih in vzpostavitvi lastne varnostne infrastrukture in lastne strateške avtonomije, vključno in najprej z vojaško.

Ampak do takrat bo preteklo še veliko časa. Evropsko zunanjo politiko bodo še dolgo določali v Washingtonu.

The EU’s worst nightmare has come true: Donald Trump is returning to the White House. It’s not hard to imagine the panic that many leaders must feeling as they gather this morning in Budapest for the European Political Community summit. Most of them, after all, have spent the past four years undermining the EU’s strategic interests by submissively aligning themselves with the Biden Administration’s reckless foreign policy everywhere from China to Gaza. The result? Europe today is more politically, economically and militarily vassalised to America than at any point since 1945.

More to the point, European elites have allowed themselves to be dragged by Washington into a disastrous proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, condemning their citizens to collapsing industry and rising prices. That’s even as the conflict in Eastern Europe exposes the continent to unprecedented military risks, including the genuine possibility of nuclear war. Yet despite all these sacrifices, all that eagerness to do the Pentagon’s bidding, Trump’s isolationist bent means it could ultimately all be for nothing.

For the past few years, the EU’s leaders have framed their entire foreign policy in American terms. Nato expansionism; economically decoupling from Russia; supporting Ukraine’s victory-at-all-costs strategy — each has been justified in the name of preserving the transatlantic alliance, even at the expense of Europe’s actual interests.

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But with Trump back in charge, and his administration likely to pursue an isolationist bent, all these sacrifices risk being pointless. Though the president-elect is unlikely to withdraw from Nato altogether, he has expressed scepticism towards the alliance during his campaign. Among other things, that has involved criticising European countries for failing to meet defence spending targets, even suggesting that the US might not protect Nato members if they don’t pull their weight.

It’s easy to see why this prospect alarms the EU establishment. For years, they have backed the “mutually reinforcing roles” of Nato and the European Union, both as a bulwark against Russia and to ensure Western dominance globally. A weakened US commitment to Nato therefore threatens the very foundations of the EU’s newfound ideological identity: an extension of the American umbrella.

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Trump has even suggested he might unilaterally impose a ceasefire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. This is unlikely to happen: Russia, which is winning on the battlefield, will push for such a hard bargain that even Trump may struggle to accept. A more likely outcome, then, is that the incoming Republican administration will continue to deliver weapons to Kyiv but ask Europe to foot the bill — a situation that would allow the conflict to smoulder on, even as Europe gets poorer. That’s despite the fact that even Western media outlets are now conceding that the war in Ukraine is lost.

This outcome could, perhaps, be avoided: if European leaders understood that putting an end to the war in Ukraine, and normalising relations with Russia, are in the continent’s ultimate economic and security interests. If they were clever, they might even seize upon Trump’s instinctive isolationism and push for a settlement themselves.

But given this would oblige Europe’s elite to totally reverse their policy on Ukraine — thereby admitting their own failure — that is an unlikely outcome. This is doubly true when you consider that such a volte-face would oblige the Europeans to finally take Russian security concerns seriously, a shift that would instantly undermine the anti-Moscow narrative they’ve been honing for years. Given, moreover, the vast economic pain the EU’s pro-Kyiv stance has caused regular Europeans, the resulting political backlash would obviously be devastating for ruling parties.

Beyond these short-term concerns, though, there are deeper geopolitical considerations. For one thing, making peace with Russia would force European leaders to finally acknowledge the multipolar order that now exists right across the globe, a reality whereby a free and independent Europe could act as a bridge between the West and the emerging Eurasian powers of the young century. For another, it would force them to realise that their future lies in breaking free from Washington’s grip, rejecting the latter’s desperate attempts to preserve its authority.

Yet if Trump’s burgeoning isolationism should be seen as an opportunity, not a threat, such a dramatic realignment isn’t going to happen: at least not for a while. Most EU leaders are just too wedded to transatlanticism — ideologically, psychologically and materially — to fully escape, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. That’s why I don’t share the optimism of those who claim that Trump’s focus on “America First” policies will push the EU to pursue greater strategic autonomy. In any case, for as long as people like Ursula von der Leyen control the levers of power in Brussels, a “European Nato” would probably be even more aggressive towards Russia than the Biden Administration.

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In the short term, then, the most likely outcome is that EU leaders will attempt to adjust to a Trump presidency and avoid awkward clashes. The tone may be different, but expect the Europeans to continue tolerating subordination to US interests.

The longer-term impact of Trump’s victory on the European political landscape is harder to predict. His victory will surely embolden Right-populist leaders across the continent, from Viktor Orbán in Hungary to Giorgia Meloni in Italy. That, in turn, has the potential to further weaken mainstream parties, and ultimately accelerate the continent’s hurdling realignment. To be clear: this won’t have an immediate political impact, especially given European populists differ in their policies towards Ukraine and other foreign policy issues.

Vir: Thomas Fazi, Unherd