Takšen je naslov še svežega članka v The Economistu. Tovrstni članki zadnje tedne pospešeno sledijo iz dneva v dan v največjih zahodnih medijih. Če največji pro-vojni propagandni stroj, ki mu s teksti strežejo ameriške obveščevalne službe, objavlja tovrstne vsebine, kaže na to, da je Ukrajina res pred kolapsom. Spodaj je nekaj odstavkov iz Economistovega članka. Ob tipičnem bullshitu – ki, kot je običajno za tekste, ki jih pišejo tekstopisci obveščevalnih služb, degradira nasprotnika in njegovo sposobnost nadaljevanja vojne in učinkovitega vojskovanja – pa je treba biti v tekstu pozoren na glavna sporočila. In sicer:

(1) da ameriško vodstvo in načrtovalci zasebno ne verjamejo v možnost ukrajinskega preobrata, čeprav javno dajejo povsem drugačne izjave,

(2) da zahodne države nimajo več orožja, ki bi ga še lahko dale Ukrajini,

(3) da je Ukrajini zmanjkalo vojakov in orožja, in

(4) da Rusiji ne bo zmanjkalo vojakov in da ruska vojaška industrija letno proizvede nekajkrat več streliva in orožja kot vse zahodne države skupaj.

Torej blefa Zelenskega z “načrtom za zmago” med zahodnimi politiki po pričakovanju nihče ni jemal resno, prav tako pa nihče med zahodnimi politiki nima ideje, kako bi lahko preprečili popolni poraz in kapitulacijo Ukrajine. Ker enostavno nimajo s čim.

Toda, da se bo to zgodilo, smo vedeli že pred dvema letoma in pol in svarili, da se bo to zgodilo. In opozarjali na neprimerno boljše opcije, ki jih je Ukrajina imela. Toda, politiki in javnost na zahodu so preveč hoteli to vojno. Ker so jih namesto razuma vodili interesi ali pa čustva in antipatija do Rusije in Putina.

Čustva in geopolitika pač nimajo stičnih točk. Če Rusija ne želi imeti Nata v Ukrajini, ga v Ukrajini pač ne bo. In če ZDA ne želijo imeti ruskih jedrskih konic na Kubi ali v Mehiki, jih tam pač ne bo. Velesile imajo moč, da si to “pravico” vzamejo.

“After 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.

Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.

The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilisation law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilisation age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits. But political sensitivities and fears over an already alarming demographic crisis stand in the way of any change.

…

But the crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defence industry is in part dependent on the refurbishment of Soviet-era stocks, which are getting low in critical areas such as armoured vehicles. It is nonetheless far outperforming Western production lines. The European Union claims to be making more than 1m shells per year; Russia is making three times that, and is also boosted by supplies from North Korea and Iran. “I just don’t know we can produce enough, give enough,” says a person familiar with the flow of American aid, though a recent $800m commitment to boost Ukraine’s indigenous drone production is welcome. “We have no more to give them without taking serious risks in other places.” On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent. Its army is recruiting around 30,000 men per month, says the NATO official. That is not enough to meet internal targets, says another official, but it is adequate to cover even the gargantuan losses of recent months.

Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first. “Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in the Donbas next year,” writes Mr Watling, “and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances.” That, he warns, would give Russia leverage in any negotiations that follow.

The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning.

Vir: The Economist