V današnjem uvodniku The Economist pove tri radikalne stvari:
- Če Ukrajina in Zahod hočeta konec vojne v Ukrajini, morata najprej priznati, da jo Ukrajina močno izgublja,
- Ukrajina se mora znebiti iluzije, da bo zmagala v vojni in pridobila nazaj izgubljena ozemlja, in
- Treba je tvegati in Ukrajino povabiti v Nato ter nato braniti njen okrnjen teritorij, pri čemer na ukrajinskem ozemlju ne bo sil Nata.
O mirovnem sporazumu z Rusijo ni govora, razen, da niti ni potreben. Niti ni analize možnosti Natove obrambe okrnjenega teritorija Ukrajine, niti analize tveganj, če bi se Nato res angažiral v tej smeri. Je pa ta uvodnik začetek spuščanja realizma v analizo situacije v Ukrajini. Do končne situacije, ki bo res prinesla mir v Ukrajini, pa je še daleč. Ta situacija pa je (najverjetneje) naslednja:
- Rusija bo obdržala zasedena ozemlja z rusko govorečim prebivalstvom (Krim in 4 regije),
- Vmesni teritorij do desnega brega reke Dnjeper bo demilitarizirano območje (pod protektoratom Rusije),
- Teritorij levo od reke Dnjeper (zahodna Ukrajina) bo “Nova Ukrajina”, ki se bo lahko vključila v EU in Nato (če jo bodo v obeh združbah zaradi specifičnosti Ukrajine sploh hoteli).
Prove me wrong čez nekaj let.
If Ukraine and its Western backers are to win, they must first have the courage to admit that they are losing. In the past two years Russia and Ukraine have fought a costly war of attrition. That is unsustainable. When Volodymyr Zelensky travelled to America to see President Joe Biden this week, he brought a “plan for victory”, expected to contain a fresh call for arms and money. In fact, Ukraine needs something far more ambitious: an urgent change of course.
A measure of Ukraine’s declining fortunes is Russia’s advance in the east, particularly around the city of Pokrovsk. So far, it is slow and costly. Recent estimates of Russian losses run at about 1,200 killed and wounded a day, on top of the total of 500,000. But Ukraine, with a fifth as many people as Russia, is hurting too. Its lines could crumble before Russia’s war effort is exhausted.
Ukraine is also struggling off the battlefield. Russia has destroyed so much of the power grid that Ukrainians will face the freezing winter with daily blackouts of up to 16 hours. People are tired of war. The army is struggling to mobilise and train enough troops to hold the line, let alone retake territory. There is a growing gap between the total victory many Ukrainians say they want, and their willingness or ability to fight for it.
Abroad, fatigue is setting in. The hard right in Germany and France argue that supporting Ukraine is a waste of money. Donald Trump could well become president of the United States. He is capable of anything, but his words suggest that he wants to sell out Ukraine to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin.
If Mr Zelensky continues to defy reality by insisting that Ukraine’s army can take back all the land Russia has stolen since 2014, he will drive away Ukraine’s backers and further divide Ukrainian society. Whether or not Mr Trump wins in November, the only hope of keeping American and European support and uniting Ukrainians is for a new approach that starts with leaders stating honestly what victory means.
…
The second way to make Ukraine’s defence credible is for Mr Biden to say Ukraine must be invited to join NATO now, even if it is divided and, possibly, without a formal armistice. Mr Biden is known to be cautious about this. Such a declaration from him, endorsed by leaders in Britain, France and Germany, would go far beyond today’s open-ended words about an “irrevocable path” to membership.
This would be controversial, because NATO’s members are expected to support each other if one of them is attacked. In opening a debate about this Article 5 guarantee, Mr Biden could make clear that it would not cover Ukrainian territory Russia occupies today, as with East Germany when West Germany joined NATO in 1955; and that Ukraine would not necessarily garrison foreign NATO troops in peacetime, as with Norway in 1949.
NATO membership entails risks. If Russia struck Ukraine again, America could face a terrible dilemma: to back Ukraine and risk war with a nuclear foe; or refuse and weaken its alliances around the world. However, abandoning Ukraine would also weaken all of America’s alliances—one reason China, Iran and North Korea are backing Russia. Mr Putin is clear that he sees the real enemy as the West. It is deluded to think that leaving Ukraine to be defeated will bring peace.
Indeed, a dysfunctional Ukraine could itself become a dangerous neighbour. Already, corruption and nationalism are on the rise.
Vir: The Economist
Članek v Economistu je lep primer zahodnih iluzij. Ti ljudje nimajo pojma o svetu v katerem živijo, še najmanj o njegovi vojaški komponenti. Saj ne da bi bil kak fan Martyanova (Reminiscence of the future -blog), ampak v tem ima prav.
Komentator predpostavlja, da bo samo dejstvo, da bo Ukrajina sprejeta v NATO odvrnilo ustrašilo Ruse. Niti na pamet mu ne pride, da bi Rusi lahko eskalirali. In kaj potem?
Bo šel NATO v vojno z Rusi? S čim pa?
Rusi imajo v tem trenutku pol milijona aktivih vojakov v rezervi. Rezervi, ki je šla čez proces rotacije na fronti. Ki ima izkušene vojake, da o oficirskem kadru niti ne govorimo. Ki ima vojno industrijo v polnem teku. Ne pozabiti, da ima Rusija trenutno kljub več kot milijonu aktiviranih vojakov še več kot 2 milijona rezervistov.
Cel NATO (brez Turčije) v tem primeru, če upoštevamo besede Dougls-a Mcgregorja (n on verjetno že ve) ni spososben aktivirati niti pol milijona vojakov. Dolgoročni cilj NATO-a je biti sposoben formirati 300 tisoč glavo mobilno rezervo. Bo to dovolj?
In predpostavke je seveda, da spopad ne bi bil jedrski. Kar je zelo majava predpostavka. Bistveno bolj realna opcija, tako kot za časa hladne vojne je, da bi tak spopad zelo hitro eskaliral v jedrsko vojno. Ima tu NATO kakšno prednost?
Nobene! Rusija ima več jedrskih glav (deklariranih), bistveno večjo in bolj razvito jedrsko industrijo in bolj napredne nosilce jedrskega orožja. NATO nima ničesar s katerim bi lahko preprečil jedrski napad, obramba proti hipersoničnim raketam, kot kaže izkušnja iz ukrajinske vojne, ne obstaja. Tudi pozabite na prednost v ISR komponeneti predvsem vesoljski. V resnem spopadu te komponente verjetno v nekaj urah ne bi bilo več. In na vesoljskem ISR-u temelji vsa zahodna vojaška doktrina. Kako je že rekel ruski general: ” V vesolju ni kritja”.
Bodo Rusi sprejeli zahodna zagotovila o tem, da NATO ne bo vzpostavljal baz v Ukrajini? Res mislite, da so Rusi po vseh izkušnjah z Zahodom, z nategom iz 22. februarja 2014, ko je NATO podprl ukrajinski puč dan po tem, ko je sklenil sporazum z Rusi o mirni rešitvi Ukrajinske krize. pripravljeni verjeti zahodnim zagotovilom. Ko sta Holland in Merklova s figo v žepu podpisoval aSporazume iz Minsk-a? Pozabite! Rusi bodo ta konflikt rešili z orožjem. In ustavili se bodo tam (v Ukrajini) kjer bodo hoteli.
Zakaj? Ker jim nihče ne more tega preprečiti.
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