V The Economistu, ki je običajno zelo neprijazen do neliberalnih režimov, ki niso po njegovem okusu in ki je znan po tem, da rad neštetokrat objavlja, kako bosta denimo kitajsko in rusko gospodarstvo zdaj pa čisto zares kolapsirala, je objavil zanimivo ekonomsko poročilo o ruskem gospodarstvu. V poročilu pravi, da rusko gospodarstvo ne samo cveti, ampak leti. Razlog naj ne bi bil (kot običajno) povečan izvoz, ampak povečana domača poraba. In sicer predvsem javne investicije (vojaška industrija, infrastruktura) in zasebna poraba. Rusija je celo prejšnje desetletje vodila striktno restriktivno fiskalno politiko (zaradi česar je njen javni dolg ekstremno nizek – povprečno 15 % BDP v desetletju do 2022, zdaj 19 % BDP), zdaj pa je odprla mošnjiček in troši. Letošnji proračunski deficit naj bi znašal 2 % BDP (kar je malo po zahodnih standardih). Rusija si to lahko privošči zaradi velikih finančnih rezerv, ki si jih ustvarila v preteklosti. Kot pravijo v The Economistu: Rusija je dolgo “varčevala, da ima lahko sedaj zabavo”.
Na drugi strani kljub veliki inflaciji zasebna poraba raste, saj dohodki rastejo hitreje od cen. Ruska centralna banka je sicer dvignila obrestno mero na 18 %, kar bi večino zahodnih držav poslalo v recesijo. Ne pa tudi Rusije. Kajti ruska vlada je zavarovala gospodinjstva (z moratoriji na odplačevanje kreditov), podjetja pa so nezadolžena. Visoka obrestna mera pa privablja tuje investicije iz prijateljski držav.
Kako dolgo si lahko Rusija privošči to trošenje? V The Economistu pravijo, da dokler ne potroši velikih finančnih rezerv. In to je kakšnih 5 let ali več.
Tole je precej streznjujoče za zahodne analitike. Kajti zahodni politiki ne morejo tako dolgo čakati na kolaps ruskega gospodarstva. Rusija mora v tem času zmagati vojno v Ukrajini, evrska gospodarstva pa se izviti iz stagnacije, kar bo za slednje težko ob teh cenah energentov in izgubljeni konkurenčnosti ter restriktivni fiskalni politiki, ki jo uvaja Bruselj (proračunski deficiti so blizu ali bad mejo 3 % BDP). Fiskalno varčevanje še dodatno ubija rast. Zdi se, da bo prej Rusija izčrpala zahodne države, predvsem evrske, kot pa obratno. In problem je, da imajo demokratične zahodne države krajši politični časovni horizont od Putinovega. Demokratično izvoljene vlade težko zdržijo 4 leta recesije ali stagnacije. Razraste se nezadovoljstvo in populizem odnese vladajoče. Torej zgodi se jim lahko to, kar so zahodni politiki napovedovali Putinu – da bo nezadovoljstvo zaradi sankcij spodbudilo nemire v Rusiji, zaradi česar bo Putinov režim padel. To je bila skrajno neumna predpostavka za avtokratski režim, je pa realistična za demokratične režime.
Across the world worries are mounting about the economy. In America and Canada unemployment is rising, while consumer sentiment remains depressed. Europe continues to flirt with recession. Don’t even mention China. Yet there is one place where the mood is quite different. Despite fierce sanctions and pariah status, Russia’s economy is growing strongly. It turns out that bacchanalian spending, at a time of war, really juices an economy.
Chart: The Economist
This year Russian GDP is expected to rise by over 3% in real terms, faster than 95% of rich countries. In May and June economic activity “significantly increased”, according to the central bank. Other “real time” measures of activity, including one published by Goldman Sachs, a bank, suggest the economy is accelerating (see chart 1). Unemployment is close to an all-time low; the rouble is doing fine. True, inflation is too high—in June prices rose by 8.6% year on year, well above the central bank’s target of 4%—but with cash incomes growing by 14% year on year, the purchasing power of Russians is rising fast. In contrast with almost everyone else, Russians are feeling good about the economy.
Chart: The Economist
Consumer confidence, as measured by Russia’s statistical agency, is well above its average since Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000. You might expect Mr Putin to be goosing the numbers. But the Levada Centre, an independent pollster, finds equally startling trends (see chart 2). Only once in the past three decades has sentiment been higher. Russians’ confidence in their own financial situation, according to official data, recently jumped to an all-time high. They are more inclined to make big purchases, such as a car or a sofa, and restaurants are full. Last year Russians imported 18% more cognac than they did in 2019, according to our estimate, while spending 80% more on imports of sparkling wine. Sberbank, Russia’s largest financial institution, notes that in June overall consumer spending rose by 20% year on year in nominal terms.
The latest data are in sharp contrast to the 2010s. Back then, output and incomes grew slowly or not at all. By 2018 real wages were no higher than in 2012. People were fed up. A round of sanctions, which the West launched in 2014 following Mr Putin’s annexation of Crimea, contributed to the malaise. So did an unusually austere fiscal policy, involving increases in taxation and cuts to spending. The covid-19 pandemic and another barrage of Western sanctions, imposed in 2022 in response to Mr Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, compounded Russians’ financial woes.
What explains the turnaround? It is tempting to credit Russian exports. Mr Putin has been able to divert hydrocarbons once destined for Europe to other parts of the world. Russian oligarchs, and the companies they run, are doing better than had been feared at the start of the war. In reality, however, Russia’s recent export performance is nothing to write home about. Oil prices are lower than a couple of years ago. In the first quarter of 2024 the total value of Russia’s physical exports was 4% lower in dollar terms than the same period of 2023—and a third lower than in 2022.
To understand the accelerating economy, look to two aspects of macroeconomic policy. The first is fiscal policy. Mr Putin has abandoned austerity. This year Russia will run a budget deficit of 2% of GDP—hefty by its standards—which it is funding in large part by drawing on its enormous financial reserves, accumulated during the 2010s. In effect, Russia saved yesterday in order to party today. Total government outlays rose by an average of 15% in both 2022 and 2023, and a slightly smaller rise is budgeted this year. Ministers are devoting much of this extra spending to the war in Ukraine. Data published by the Bank of Finland suggest that military spending will rise by about 60% this year, boosting production of weapons and ammunition, and also putting money in people’s pockets.
In July Mr Putin doubled the federal bonus for those signing up to fight from 195,000 roubles ($2,200) to 400,000 roubles, which regional authorities are supposed to top up. The government is committing vast sums on compensation to the families of those killed in action. And Russia’s splurge goes beyond war-related spending. Mr Putin is lavishing money on welfare payments: in June he raised pensions for some recipients by close to 10%. The government is also spending big on infrastructure, including a highway from Kazan to Yekaterinburg, two cities 450 miles (729km) apart. Indeed, it is spending on pretty much whatever takes its fancy. Mikhail Mishustin, the prime minister, recently boasted about a government scheme to pay for children to holiday in Crimea.
The second reason for Russia’s party economy relates to its unusual monetary policy. To deal with high inflation the central bank has raised interest rates from 7.5% to 18%. More increases may be on their way. This has the effect of strengthening the rouble by attracting foreign investment from “friendly” countries such as China and India, which in turn cuts the price of imports and thus inflation. It also encourages people to save, trimming consumer spending. In a normal economy higher rates would also hurt indebted households and companies, as their cost of repaying debt rose. Yet the government has almost entirely shielded the real economy from tighter monetary policy.
There is a bewildering array of schemes. Earlier this year the government made it much easier for consumers to suspend repayments on loans, so long as they could prove that their income had fallen or they were “affected by an emergency”. Banks have offered loan holidays to soldiers in Ukraine. A mortgage scheme, recently closed, kept lending rates fixed at 8%, less than half the current policy rate. An “industrial mortgage” programme has channelled lending to businesses at rates as little as 3% a year. There is also arm-twisting of banks to get them not to raise rates too far. When the financial sector loses income as a consequence, the state often makes up the difference.
Chart: The Economist
This meddling has clear effects. According to official data, in the first quarter of 2024 households spent 11% of their disposable income servicing debt—about the same as in 2021, when the policy rate was much lower. In the past year the interest rate facing households and firms has risen, but by only about half as much as the policy rate (see chart 3). New borrowing is healthy. Lending to companies is growing at more than 20% a year. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, unsecured consumer lending has grown about as fast as nominal wages, which is to say very fast indeed.
How long can the party last? Mr Putin’s attempts to blunt interest-rate rises will lead inflation to rise higher, and last longer, than it would have otherwise. At some point, people may get angry about the rising cost of living. He also cannot run budget deficits for ever. At current rates, Russia’s financial reserves will be exhausted in five years or so; meanwhile, the government faces high borrowing costs. But for now, Mr Putin has a war to win. And so the party goes on.
DAMIJAN blog 