Some history lessons for the “no peace on Russia’s terms” people

Tule je današnji ruski predlog glede “zaustavitve ognja” v Ukrajini. Ki seveda ne bo niti obravnavan na nasprotni strani in pri njenih sponzorjih. Pa čeprav je blizu temu, kar bo (zelo verjetno) nekoč tudi uveljavljeno v obliki uradnega mirovnega sporazuma. Ampak do takrat bo preteklo še nekaj vode. In se ne bo zgodilo, dokler Ukrajini ne bo zmanjkalo za orožje sposobnih moških. Takšne so pač zakonitosti vojne izčrpavanja med veliko in majhno državo.

Spodaj pa je finska izkušnja z vojno z Rusijo iz leta 1939 in s kakšnim sporazumom se je vojna končala.

Ni se treba strinjati ne z enim in ne drugim. Velja pa poznati.

Finland and Russia (Soviet Union) fought two wars between 1939 and 1944, where Finland eventually lost 12% of her landmass. First was an aggression by the Russian side and the second from Finland.

The aggression of Russia in the fall 1939 was based on the secret amendment of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, where Finland was placed on the “sphere of influence” of Russia. Russian leadership staged a ‘false flag’ attack, of Finland to Russia, in the village of Mainila.

Four days later, on 30 November 1939, Russia attacked Finland with an overwhelming force (in some parts of the front the ratio was 10:1 for Russia).

Finland kept her independence in the “Miracle of Winter War”, but lost 11% of her territory. War ended on 12 March 1940.

After peace, Finland found herself in a very difficult situation.

She held the largest known nickel deposit in Europe in Petsamo, which both Hitler and Stalin sought to command. Her choices were: join forces with Germany or face a possible new Soviet invasion.

Finland chose the former, and on 25 June, 1941, Finland became an “unofficial partner” in Operation Barbarossa, i.e., on the attack of Nazi Germany to Russia, which had commenced just three days earlier.

Effectively, we were in a military alliance with the Nazi Germany.

The two wars resulted to a loss of around 12 percent of Finland’s territory, including Petsamo.

The Moscow Armistice, signed on Sept. 19, 1944, marked the beginning of a period of eight decades during which Finland chose to remain neutral in geopolitical matters.

In the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, or ”YYA,” signed on April 6, 1948, Finland agreed to remain outside alliances and to treat Germany or any of its allies threatening Russia through its territory as an enemy.

The agreement was a stroke of genius from President Paasikivi, as it kept Finland outside the Warsaw Pact but also initially outside Western organizations.

Presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen formulated a policy line of passive neutrality called the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine.

While the Paris Peace Treaty limited the size of Finland’s military for some time after World War II, Finland systematically built up her army to be able to counter any further Soviet Union aggression, while not making herself a threat.

The policy was a great success, with Finland strengthening her independence, while trade with the Soviet Union, whose international trade was heavily sanctioned by several Western governments, grew rapidly, feeding Finland’s rapid economic ascension.

Finland shares a 1340km border with Russia. The Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine made possible a peaceful and prosperous co-existence with the (superpower) Soviet Union.

Now, as an ‘asset’ of NATO, we are about to lose even the spirit of that very successful doctrine.

What did we learn? That lasting peace with Russia is possible with two preconditions:

  1. You make yourself militarily a ‘bitter pill’ to swallow.
  2. You do not make yourself a threat.

Ukraine failed on both, and Finland is about to fail on the latter.

I need to add that my family has lost both land and people fighting Russia. You people associating me with Kremlin have no *** idea what you’re talking about.

Vir: Tuomas Malinen