Če bi Nemčija namesto v OVE investirala v jedrsko energijo…

… bi za 73 % bolj znižala izpuste CO2 in izdatki bi bili za polovico nižji. Tako izhaja iz pravkar objavljene študije, ki jo je objavil Jan Emblemsvåg v International Journal of Sustainable Energy. Te ugotovitve potrjujejo ugotovitve analize za Slovenijo, ki sva jo naredila s kolego Babičem (polna verzija v fazi objave). Zgolj s sončnimi in vetrnimi elektrarnami ni mogoče bistevno znižati CO2 izpustov (ker potrebujejo nadomestne kapacitete v obliki fleksibilnih elektrarn na plin ali premog), medtem ko je s kombinacijo hidro in jedrske energije ter nekaj sončnih / ali vetrnih elektrarn (max do 15 %) mogoče doseči razogljičenje proizvodnje električne energije, hkrati pa so potrebne investicije za polovico nižje kot v primeru čistega OVE koncepta.

Kako dolgo bodo politiki in politični funkcionarji še ignorirali stroko in znanost?

Germany has one of the most ambitious energy transition policies dubbed ‘Die Energiewende’ to replace nuclear- and fossil power with renewables such as wind-, solar- and biopower. The climate gas emissions are reduced by 25% in the study period of 2002 through 2022. By triangulating available information sources, the total nominal expenditures are estimated at EUR 387 bn, and the associated subsidies are some EUR 310 bn giving a total nominal expenditures of EUR 696 bn. Alternatively, Germany could have kept the existing nuclear power in 2002 and possibly invest in new nuclear capacity.

Thus, this paper poses the simple question – what if Germany had spent their money on nuclear power and not followed their policy from 2002 through 2022 (20 years); would Germany have achieved more emission reductions and lower expenses? To answer this research question requires first an assessment of the results of the German policy covering the period of 2002 through 2022 to establish a baseline. Then, two choices occur that could have been dealt with independently given Germany’s long nuclear history and competence – (1) to keep existing NPPs running, and/or (2) to invest in new NPPs. As noted, Germany has opted out of both these choices and invested in VREs, which makes the case particularly interesting.

The analysis of these two alternatives shows that Germany could have reached its climate gas emission target by achieving a 73% cut in emissions on top of the achievements in 2022 and simultaneously cut the spending in half compared to Energiewende. Thus, Germany should have adopted an energy policy based on keeping and expanding nuclear power.

The relevance of the research is not only given by the difference in policy choices observed, but also that the German Federal Accounting Office (Bundesrechnungshof) writes about the German policy dubbed ‘Die Energiewende’ in German, and it concludes: ‘The Bundesrechnungshof warns that the energy transition in its current form [based on the Energiewende] poses a threat to the German economy and overburdens the financial capacity of electricity-consuming companies and households’ (Bundesrechnungshof Citation2021a). Thus, understanding these policy choices is vital for Germany but also for other countries considering various energy transition paths.

Vir: Jan Emblemsvåg, International Journal of Sustainable Energy

En odgovor

  1. Odločitev o ukinitvi jedrskih elektrarn v Nemčiji ni bila sprejeta iz okoljskih vidikov, ampak predvsen iz varnostnega vidika in prebivalstvo je to odločitev podpiralo. O smiselnosti prehoda na vire z manj CO2 se da razpravljati. Ampak kdor pozna Nemčijo, potuje po njej, spremlja kaj se tam vse dogaja glede investicij v na primer ogrevanje mest s podtalno vročo vodo, prehoda na vodik v industriji in še mnogo več je tega, lahko samo joka na slovensko taktiko: No pa poganjajmo JEK1 še naslednjih 50 let in vmes ne naredimo nič. Kot vedno bodo slovenska inovativna podjetja morala iskati kupce v Nemčiji namesto doma.

    Všeč mi je