Aleš Praprotnik

Mark Blyth, Eric Lonergan in Simon Wren-Lewis se v nedavnem blogu v Guardianu sprašujejo, kaj bi se zgodilo, če bi centralna banka ostala brez svojih magičnih trikov oz. (običajnih in malo manj konvencionalnih) orodij monetarne politike, glede na to, da Cameronova vlada v njej vidi edino rešiteljico gospodarskega okrevanja in varovalko pred recesijami? Vlada namreč verjame, da je kriza mimo in da se bodo sedaj zbudili živalski nagoni zasebnega gospodarstva, obrestne mere pa oživele. Vendar, opozarjajo avtorji, je to politika, ki temelji zgolj na upih. Odgovorna vlada bi po njihovem morala imeti dobro izdelan načrt za nepredvidene dogodke in opremiti neodvisno centralno banko s pravimi orodji, da lahko opravlja svoje delo. Orodja, ki so ji sedaj na voljo, pa so iztrošena.

Avtorji menijo, da dosedanji QE ni imel velikega učinka in da bi ga imel prihodnji QE še manj, prav tako pa lahko ustvari dodatne probleme, zato pozivajo britansko vlado, naj za Bank of England (BoE) uzakoni in uvede možnost neposrednih plačil gospodinjstvom. BoE bi v skladu s svojo neodvisnostjo lahko sama določala višino plačil in odločala, kdaj bi jih nakazovala, prav tako pa bi obenem spremljala in nadzorovala inflacijo (preko dviga obrestnih mer idr.). Avtorji menijo, da bi bilo še najmanj problematično plačilo vsem gospodinjstvom v enakem znesku.

BoE je prek QE v bančni sektor vložila okoli 20 % britanskega BDP, ocenjuje pa se da je zaradi tega BDP zrastel zgolj za 3 %. Po drugi strani empirični podatki iz držav, ki so uvedle primerljive ukrepe (npr. davčne olajšave v ZDA), kažejo, da potrošniki zelo hitro potrošijo med tretjino in polovico takšnih prihodkov. Za dvig BDP za 1 % bi tako morali sprostiti za okoli 3 % BDP neposrednih plačil.

This lopsided approach to policy has an inbuilt liability. If everything rests on the monetary magic of the Bank of England, what happens if the Bank runs out of tricks? Interest rates are close to zero, the yield curve is relatively flat, and the banking system is already flush with liquidity. Given our experience with “unconventional policy” to date, there are growing concerns that more of the same ­ negative interest rates or further bouts of quantitative easing (QE) ­may cause more problems than they solve.

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With fiscal policy off the table, and existing monetary tools exhausted, we propose that the government legislates to empower the Bank of England with the ability to make payments directly to the household sector – QE for the people. With this tool the Bank would be equipped to mitigate any sharp slowdown in the economy, caused by domestic or external factors, such as a deflationary shock from a Chinese or US recession, or a continued slump in the eurozone.

The empirical evidence from analogous policies – such as tax rebates in the US – suggests that transfers to the household sector would have a far greater impact on demand at a fraction of the size of QE. Consumers appear to quickly spend between a third and a half of any cash windfalls. So to increase consumption by 1% of GDP, you would need a transfer of 3% of GDP. UK QE currently stands at about 20% of annual GDP. The Bank of England estimates this raised GDP by 3%. Further QE would likely have less effect. So cash transfers to consumers are a far more effective stimulus than that provided by more QE for a lower spend.

Consistent with operational independence of the Bank of England, the size of payments and their timing should be solely under its control, and subject to the inflation target. Parliament needs to equip the Bank with the infrastructure to administer payments, and determine in advance the recipients. An equal payment to all households is likely to be the least controversial rule. It would have an immediate impact on spending and it is transparent and fair – favouring neither borrowers nor savers, rich nor poor, nor one demographic over another.

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What about longer­-term inflationary effects? It is difficult to see why printing money on a far smaller scale than under QE should have a pernicious effect on inflation if the much larger costs associated with QE have failed to do so. If there is a sustained recovery in demand, the Bank can simply raise interest rates as per the inflation target. If the Bank ever runs out of the assets it needs to do this, the government can commit to provide them in much the same way as it has already done for potential QE losses. A government that would renege on this commitment and allow inflation is also a government that would abolish the independence of the Bank to achieve that aim.

The last significant innovation in the Bank of England’s history was operational independence and the inflation-targeting mandate. Economic times have changed. Inflation credibility is no longer the only priority. The current economic plan is to rely on the Bank while hoping nothing goes wrong. Yet fundamental weaknesses in the tools of monetary policy have been revealed by the financial crisis and yet we keep asking the monetary authority to do more, not less. To do more, the Bank needs a new tool.