Anatole Kaletsky je že februarja v Project Syndicatu podvomil v pogajalske možnosti Yanisa Varoufakisa, kljub njegovemu backgroundu v teoriji iger. Tokrat Kaletsky analizira, kako je pogajalska taktika Varoufakisa temeljila na napačnih predpostavkah. Če je pred meseci grozil z bankrotom Grčije (ki bi potencialno razstrelil tudi evrsko območje), da bi na ta način dobil brezpogojno zmanjšanje dolga, se mu je ta taktika izjalovila. Pogajalci na drugi strani so izbrali pogajalsko taktiko obleganja, zaprli finančne pipice in čakajo, da se Grčija finančno izstrada, nakar bo pristala na vse pogoje.

Varoufakisova strategija je temeljila na predpostavki, da bi grčija v primeru bankrota lahko izkoristila velik primarni presežek v proračunu (4% BDP), ki se je nakazoval v začetku leta in tako pokrila izdatke za plače in pokojnine. Vendar tega presežka ni bilo in grška vlada ne more več izsiljevati, da bo namesto za obresti ta presežek namenila za plače in pokojnine. Grška grožnja je postala nekredibilna in bi zdaj v primeru Grexita in bankrota zahtevala celo večje reze v javne izdatke kot v primeru zahtev trojke.

S tem pa problemov za grško vlado še ni konec. Tudi če bi Grčija uvedla svojo valuto (novo drahmo) in s tem de facto izstopila iz evrskega območja, vendar ostala v EU, bi evropsko sodišče utegnilo razsoditi, da mora Grčija svoje obveznosti do domačih subjektov in bančne depozite poravnati v evrih, kar bi Grčijo potisnilo v bankrot tako do tujih kot do domačih upnikov. To pa bi odneslo tudi Sirizo z oblasti. Zato Kaletsky, ki aludira na Varoufakisovo izjavo izpred nekaj mesecev, da v tej igri ne gre za to, kdo bo pomežiknil prvi, pravi, da ima grška vlada zelo slabe karte in da bo pomežiknila prva. Kapitulacija naj bi bila zgolj vprašanje časa.

This brinkmanship is no accident. Since coming to power in January, the Greek government, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza party, has believed that the threat of default – and thus of a financial crisis that might break up the euro – provides negotiating leverage to offset Greece’s lack of economic and political power. Months later, Tsipras and his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, an academic expert in game theory, still seem committed to this view, despite the lack of any evidence to support it.

But their calculation is based on a false premise. Tsipras and Varoufakis assume that a default would force Europe to choose between just two alternatives: expel Greece from the eurozone or offer it unconditional debt relief. But the European authorities have a third option in the event of a Greek default. Instead of forcing a “Grexit,” the EU could trap Greece inside the eurozone and starve it of money, then simply sit back and watch the Tsipras government’s domestic political support collapse.

Such a siege strategy – waiting for Greece to run out of the money it needs to maintain the normal functions of government – now looks like the EU’s most promising technique to break Greek resistance. It is likely to work because the Greek government finds it increasingly difficult to scrape together enough money to pay wages and pensions at the end of each month.

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The Tsipras-Varoufakis strategy assumed that Greece could credibly threaten to default, because the government, if forced to follow through, would still have more than enough money to pay for wages, pensions, and public services. That was a reasonable assumption back in January. The government had budgeted for a large primary surplus (which excludes interest payments), which was projected at 4% of GDP.

If Greece had defaulted in January, this primary surplus could (in theory) have been redirected from interest payments to finance the higher wages, pensions, and public spending that Syriza had promised in its election campaign. Given this possibility, Varoufakis may have believed that he was making other EU finance ministers a generous offer by proposing to cut the primary surplus from 4% to 1% of GDP, rather than all the way to zero. If the EU refused, his implied threat was simply to stop paying interest and make the entire primary surplus available for extra public spending.

But what if the primary surplus – the Greek government’s trump card in its confrontational negotiating strategy – has now disappeared? In that case, the threat of default is no longer credible. With the primary surplus gone, a default would no longer permit Tsipras to fulfill Syriza’s campaign promises; on the contrary, it would imply even bigger cutbacks in wages, pensions, and public spending than the “troika” – the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF – is now demanding.

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The legal and political mechanisms for treating Greece like a municipal bankruptcy are clear. The European treaties state unequivocally that euro membership is irreversible unless a country decides to exit not just from the single currency but from the entire EU. That is also the political message that EU governments want to instill in their own citizens and financial investors.

If Greece defaults, the EU will be legally justified and politically motivated to insist that the euro remains its only legal tender. Even if the Greek government decides to pay wages and pensions by printing its own IOUs or “new drachmas,” the European Court of Justice will rule that all domestic debts and bank deposits must be repaid in euros. That, in turn, will force a default against Greek citizens, as well as foreign creditors, because the government will be unable to honor the euro value of insured deposits in Greek banks.

So a Greek default within the euro, far from allowing Syriza to honor its election promises, would inflict even greater austerity on Greek voters than they endured under the troika program. At that point, the government’s collapse would become inevitable. Instead of Greece exiting the eurozone, Syriza would exit the Greek government. As soon as Tsipras realizes that the rules of the game between Greece and Europe have changed, his capitulation will be just a matter of time.

Vir: Anatole Kaletsky