Za razliko od večine komentatorjev, ki v klofuti ECB novi grški vladi (nesprejemanje grških obveznic kot zavarovanja za likvidnostna posojila bankam) vidijo nerazumno potiskanje Grčije prek pečine v prepad bankrota, pa ima Frances Coppola nekoliko drugačno teorijo. (Naj spomnim, da je Coppola že pred tedni podala najbolj razumno teorijo poteze švicarske CB). Coppola pravi, da s tem dejanjem ECB Grčije ne potiska čez rob pečine, pač pa s to potezo pritiska na Nemčijo, da čimprej reši ta zaplet. Merklova je namreč pred dnevi povedala, da bi lahko pogajanja z Grčijo trajala mesece. ECB pa si tako dolgega obdobja iskanja skupne rešitve ne želi, ker to še dodatno povečuje negotovost in minira ukrepe ECB glede politike QE.

Coppola pravi, da s to potezo ECB odpira partijo pokra med Varoufakisom in nemško vlado. V tej igri si Nemčija ne more privoščiti, da Grčija resnično zgrmi v prepad, ker bi to za seboj potegnilo razpad celotnega evrskega območja. Pri tem svojo teorijo bazira na tvitu Varoufakisa iz junija lani v odgovoru na vprašanje “uhm… And what if an ECB cyprus-style blackmail?“. Varoufakis odgovarja: “It would be a non-credible threat. (E.g. “We will shut down your ELA.” Answer: “Do ahead!“)”.

Hmm, nisem prepričan, da je zadeva tako preprosta, bo pa to zanimiva partija pokra Varoufakisa z Nemčijo. Več o dejanskih “outside options” Grčije bomo vedeli naslednji teden, ko se Tsipras sestane z ruskim predsednikom Putinom in po obisku sekretarja ameriškega State Departmenta v Atenah. Kot sem pisal zadnjič v Ups, Berlin, imamo problem v Grčiji, je zadnja stvar, ki bi so jo ZDA želele, ruski politični in vojaški vstop v Grčijo.

In še enkrat ponavljam: Grčija danes brani Evropo pred komunizmom (notranjim in zunanjim), tako kot je to počela zahodna Nemčija po 2. svetovni vojni. O zunanjem komunizmu mi najbrž ni treba razglabljati. Notranji vzpon “komunizma” pa je logična posledica tega, če bosta Berlin in Bruselj še naprej tako nerazumno pritiskala na južne periferne države EU. Presežen prag družbene bolečine bo tudi v ostalih državah dvignil radikalno levico (ali desnico). Ne eno, ne drugo pa ni dobro za posel, mar ne?

Frances Coppola:

I’ve thought about this a bit more now. Something doesn’t quite add up.

Firstly, there is the timing. The Syriza government has now been in power for ten days. Why did the ECB wait until now to pull the plug on the waiver? It might simply be that today was the first planned meeting of the Governing Council. But that doesn’t exactly suggest that this is an urgent problem – so why is the ECB doing this now, given that the bailout extension is not until 28th February and Greece has already asked for time to come up with an alternative plan?

Secondly, there is the timing. (Yes, I mean that). Varoufakis met ECB chief Mario Draghi yesterday and he meets German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble today. In between those two meetings the ECB pulled the waiver. Why? Well, Schäuble is openly hostile to Varoufakis’s ideas of debt relief and an end to austerity, while Draghi has so far kept very quiet (though his deputy Vitor Constancio has been more forthright). Schäuble will no doubt be looking for explicit backing from the ECB. Should this action be taken as the ECB’s governing council signalling whose side it is on?

…

Of course, today’s action is not pulling funding from Greek banks, since they can still pledge other assets at the ECB. But all funding using any form of Greek sovereign debt must, from 11 February, be obtained from the Hellenic Central Bank under the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) scheme. And the ELA scheme itself is under the control of the ECB and reviewed bi-weekly. The ECB could pull it at any moment.

Varoufakis’s comment is undoubtedly a reference to the fact that pulling ELA from Greek banks would cause their sudden disorderly collapse. The ECB has used this trick before: it threatened to pull ELA from Irish banks in 2010, and it actually pulled ELA from Cyprus’s Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus, forcing immediate closure and restructuring. This second piece of brinkmanship resulted in the worst bank bailout decision in the history of the planet, which was (fortunately) subsequently overturned by the Cypriot legislature. Undermining deposit insurance is almost criminally insane.

But pulling ELA from Greek banks would have a much larger impact. Germans fantasise that ELA can be pulled without systemic impact, but this is not remotely credible. The impact would be smaller than it would have been in 2010, but it would still be highly destabilising to the global financial system. Such an action would greatly enhance the ECB’s reputation for incompetence and probably end the careers of its senior officials.

If the collapse of the Greek banks precipitated the disorderly exit of Greece from the Euro, there would be significant losses for the ECB itself, the other Eurozone governments and probably the IMF. The impact on the European economy would be devastating and it would send shock waves around the world. And it would set an important precedent. If one member state can leave, so can others. How can the ECB have any credibility as guardian of the Euro if it is seen to be actively forcing out member states?

If the ECB forced a banking collapse by pulling ELA, Greece might try to limp on within the Eurozone as Cyprus did, using capital controls to prevent capital flight. But this would be the worst possible situation for Greece and it seems highly unlikely that the Greek government would even consider it. Greece’s economy is already in worse shape than Cyprus’s was at the time of its banking collapse, and Cyprus’s banking system was crippled but not destroyed by the restructuring. Greece’s banking system would be wrecked beyond repair. Greece would have no choice but to create a completely new currency and reflate its economy directly via the central bank. That means leaving the Euro, at least temporarily.

…

It must be remembered that this game is being played on a global stage. The US President, Barack Obama, has openly sided with the Greeks, warning that “You cannot keep on squeezing countries that are in the midst of a depression. At some point there has to be a growth strategy in order for them to pay off their debts and eliminate some of their deficits”. And the UK’s George Osborne, while calling for the Greek finance minister to “act responsibly”, also criticised the Eurozone for its lack of a coherent plan for jobs and growth. Calling for the two sides to strike a deal, he warned that the standoff between Greece and the Eurozone is the “greatest risk facing the global economy”. This seems like hyperbole to me, given the continuing crisis in Ukraine and military game-playing in the South China Sea, not to mention the Islamic insanity in the Middle East. But it all helps the Greek cause.

Varoufakis is gambling that the Eurozone, and more particularly Germany, will not dare to push him off the cliff because of the consequences for international political relations. If Germany was seen to force Greece out of the Euro by refusing to negotiate, it would become an international pariah. There are already voices reminding Germany of its own debt forgiveness in 1953, and anti-austerity movements in many other Eurozone countries would only be encouraged by Germany and/or the ECB looking like bullies. Forcing Greece out of the Euro could result in the disorderly unravelling of the whole thing.

I may be completely wrong, but this looks far more plausible to me than a simple explanation that fails to take account of the signals given by both Varoufakis and Draghi. In which case, Schäuble should beware. His position is nowhere near as strong as he thinks. He is dangerously close to the cliff edge himself. If Germany pushes Greece over the edge, Greece may well take Germany down with it.