Pred dvema letoma in pol smo si (tudi jaz) oddahnili, ker Syriza takrat ni uspela zmagati na grških volitvah. Kar je bila, gledano iz današnjega vidika, napaka. Če bi Syriza takrat zmagala, Grčija ne bi šla skozi takšno nepotrebno kalvarijo, kajti upnice, ki jih zastopa zloglasna trojka, bi morale pristati na večji odpis dolgov, nižje obrestne mere in na daljše obdobje odplačevanja dolga. Če ne bi, bi se takrat evrskemu območju bistveno slabše pisalo.

Po dveh letih in pol smo dobili svojo lekcijo in se upajmo iz nje naučili treh stvari. Prvič, da sta za obseg (slabih) kreditov kriva oba, tako dolžnik kot kreditodajalec in da morata oba pristati na kompromis. Drugič, da nihče nima pravice nobene države v demokratični skupnosti, kot naj bi bila EU, spraviti v tako hude razmere, kot je trojka naredila z Grčijo. In tretjič, če bi takrat zaustavili norijo s politiko varčevanja, ki jo je po diktatu Nemčije vsilila trojka, bi danes vsi mi bolje živeli. Recesija bi bila krajša in najbrž ne bi zašli v deflacijo.

Danes zaradi te izkušnje progresivni ekonomisti navijajo za zmago Syrize. Spodaj je mnenje Simona Wrena-Lewisa.

Moj komentar sledi jutri v Financah.

Expelling Greece from the Eurozone because they wanted to renegotiate their debts would be an incredibly stupid thing to do. For a start, the creditors would lose everything, because obviously Greece would go for complete default in those circumstances. In addition, individuals and markets would immediately worry that the same fate might befall other periphery countries. (The story that Dani Rodrik tells is all too plausible.) What would be the gain?

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So even if some in Germany were stupid and cruel enough to suggest throwing Greece out, it seems inconceivable that the rest of the Eurozone (or the IMF) would allow it. In reality reducing the debt burden in Greece (and probably elsewhere [2]) would do the Eurozone a lot of collective good. Greece would be able to relax the crippling austerity that has had disastrous economic and social consequences. The core countries and the IMF could at least partially undo the mistakes they made from 2010 to 2012 in first delaying default, and then failing to impose a complete default, mistakes IMF staff at least now recognise. German taxpayers might be encouraged to understand that the problem since 2010 has not been Greek intransigence but the actions of their own governments in trying to protect their own banks and in dispensing unrealistic degrees of austerity. Philippe Legrain argues the case in detail here. As Thomas Piketty succinctly puts it, Syriza “want to build a democratic Europe, which is what we all need”.

Vir: Simon Wren-Lewis