Ta post se navezuje na prejšnjega (Kriza zmanjšuje potencial za rast: histereza), pri čemer Larry Summers nazorno prikazuje, kako trajanje krize postopno zmanjšuje potencialno rast ameriškega BDP. Kot lahko vidite na spodnji sliki, vsako leto podaljševanja krize (nižje rasti od predkrizne) odščipne delček odstotka potencialnega BDP in trajno znižuje trajektorijo bodoče potencialne rasti.

Vir: Larry Summers (2014)

Summers v nadaljevanju analizira dolgoročne učinke tega zniževanja potencialne rasti zaradi “učinka histereze”, ki vodijo v sekularno stagnacijo in pri tem lucidno pravi, da se sicer kontroverzni Sayev zakon (vsaka ponudba ustvari svoje povpraševanje) v razmerah sekularne stagnacije lahko inkarnira v zelo perverzni obliki – “pomanjkanje povpraševanja ustvari pomanjkanje ponudbe“. Summers:

3 Conclusions and Implications

 The case made here, if valid, is troubling. It suggests that monetary as currently structured and operated may have difficulty maintaining a posture of full employment and production at potential and that if these goals are attained there is likely to be price paid in terms of financial stability. A number of questions come to mind:

• How great are the risks?

Alvin Hansen proclaimed the risk of secular stagnation at the end of the 1930s only to see the economy boom during the and after World War II. It is certainly possible that either some major exogenous event will occur that raises spending or lowers saving in a way that raises the FERIR in the industrial world and renders the concerns I have expressed irrelevant. Short of war, it is not obvious what such events might be. Moreover, most of the reasons adduced for falling FERIRs are likely to continue for at least the next decade. And there is no evidence that potential output forecasts are being increased even in countries like the US where there is some sign of growth acceleration.

• What about Hysteresis?

On their own, secular stagnation ideas do not explain the decline in potential output that has been a major feature of the experience throughout the industrial world. The available evidence though is that potential output has declined almost everywhere and in near lockstep with declines in actual output; see Ball (2014) for a summary. This suggests a way in which economies may equilibrate in the face of real rates above the FERIR. As hysteresis theories which emphasize the adverse effects of recessions on subsequent output predict, supply potential may eventually decline to the level of demand when enough investment is discouraged in physical capital, work effort and new product innovation.

Perhaps Say’s dubious law has a more legitimate corollary – “Lack of Demand creates Lack of Supply”. In the long run, as the economy’s supply potential declines, the FERIR rises restoring equilibrium, albeit not a very good one.

• What about global aspects?

There is important work to be done elucidating the idea of secular stagnation in an open economy context. The best way to think about the analysis here is to treat it as referring the aggregate economy of the industrial world where – because of capital mobility – real interest rates tend to converge (though not immediately because of the possibility of expected movements in real exchange rates). If the FERIR for the industrialized economies were low enough one might expect capital outflows to emerging markets which would be associated with a declining real exchange rates for industrial countries, increased competitiveness and increased export demand. The difficulty is that this is something that emerging markets will accept only to a limited extent. Their response is likely to be either resistance to capital inflows or efforts to manage currency values to maintain competitiveness. In either case the result will be further downward pressure on interest rates in industrial countries.

In kakšne so poti iz sekularne stagnacije? Summers jih vidi podobno kot jaz:

(1) velika vojna, ki bo dvignila raven agregatnega povpraševanja (kot je denimo 2. svetovnja vojna na laž postavila predvidevanja Alvina Hansena iz leta 1937, ko je napovedoval sekularno stagnacijo za tedanji svet), ali pa

(2) načrtno povečanje agregatnega povpraševanje prek načrtnega povečanja javnih investicij, zmanjšanje ovir za zasebne investicije, izboljšanje poslovne klime, povečanje socialnih transferjev in zmanjšanje neenakosti, kar bi dvignilo povpraševanje tistih, ki bodo največji del dohodkov potrošili.

Summers:

4.What is to be done?

Broadly to the extent that secular stagnation is a problem, there are two possible strategies for addressing its pernicious impacts.

• The first is to find ways to further reduce real interest rates.

These might include operating with a higher inflation rate target so that a zero nominal rate corresponds to a lower real rate. Or it might include finding ways such as quantitative easing that operate to reduce credit or term premiums. These strategies have the difficulty of course that even if they increase the level of output, they are also likely to increase financial stability risks, which in turn may have output consequences.

• The alternative is to raise demand by increasing investment and reducing saving.

This operates to raise the FERIR and so to promote financial stability as well as increased output and employment. How can this be accomplished? Appropriate strategies will vary from country to country and situation to situation. But they should include increased public investment, reduction in structural barriers to private investment and measures to promote business confidence, a commitment to maintain basic social protections so as to maintain spending power and measures to reduce inequality and so redistribute income towards those with a higher propensity to spend.