Drage napačne makro napovedi zaradi napačne diagnoze

Zgodba Billa Grossa, znanega kot “kralja obveznic”, ki je zaradi velike povzročene izgube moral zapustiti finančni sklad Pimco, je seveda tipičen primer napačne makro napovedi zaradi napačne diagnoze stanja. Gross, tako kot veliko jastrebov v tujini in doma, ni zmogel (želel) razumeti, da se makro pravila ekonomije razlikujejo v času normalne situacije in v času depresije. V času depresije velja depresijska ekonomika, ki se skorajda diametralno razlikuje od standardne. Kar velja kot standard odgovorne makro politike v normalnih časih (nizki javni deficiti), je napaka v času depresije. In obratno. Tako je Gross v pričakovanju visoke inflacije (zaradi velikega deficita in QE), ki je ni bilo, razprodal vse državne obveznice in spravil Pimco v težave. Preberite zgodbo spodaj.

Last week, Bill Gross, the so-called bond king, abruptly left Pimco, the investment firm he had managed for decades. People who follow the financial industry were shocked but not exactly surprised; tales of internal troubles at Pimco had been all over the papers. But why should you care?

The answer is that Mr. Gross’s fall is a symptom of a malady that continues to afflict major decision-makers, public and private. Call it depression denial syndrome: the refusal to acknowledge that the rules are different in a persistently depressed economy.

For a time, Pimco — where Paul McCulley, a managing director at the time, was one of the leading voices explaining the logic of the liquidity trap — seemed admirably calm about deficits, and did very well as a result. In late 2009, many Wall Street analysts warned of a looming surge in U.S. borrowing costs; Morgan Stanley predicted that the interest rate on 10-year bonds would soar to 5.5 percent in 2010. But Pimco bet, correctly, that rates would stay low.

Then something changed. Mr. McCulley left Pimco at the end of 2010 (he recently returned as chief economist), and Mr. Gross joined the deficit hysterics, declaring that low interest rates were “robbing” investors and selling off all his holdings of U.S. debt. In particular, he predicted a spike in interest rates when the Fed ended a program of debt purchases in June 2011. He was completely wrong, and neither he nor Pimco ever recovered.

So is this an edifying tale in which bad ideas were proved wrong by experience, people’s eyes were opened, and truth prevailed? Sorry, no. In fact, it’s very hard to find any examples of people who have changed their minds. People who were predicting soaring inflation and interest rates five years ago are still predicting soaring inflation and interest rates today, vigorously rejecting any suggestion that they should reconsider their views in light of experience.

And that’s what makes the Bill Gross story interesting. He’s pretty much the only major deficit hysteric to pay a price for getting it wrong (even though he remains, of course, immensely rich). Pimco has taken a hit, but everywhere else the reign of error continues undisturbed.

Vir: Paul Krugman, NY Times

Update:

Za tiste, ki niste spremljali debate zadnja 3 leta, tukaj je compendium v izboru Brade DeLonga