Svetovalec predsednika Obame Larry Summers je pred dvema mesecema odprl vprašanje “sekularne stagnacije”, ki je posledica premajhnega domačega povpraševanja, to pa posledica stagnacije povprečnih plač v ZDA in povečane neenakosti v razdelitvi dohodkov. Konec prejšnjega leta je predsednik Obama napovedoval boj proti neenakosti kot ključno razvojno vprašanje ZDA oziroma “the defining challenge of our time.” Hkrati s tem se je v ekonomski blogosferi vnela ekstenzivna diskusija o tem, ali je to sploh pravo vprašanje oziroma kaj je bolj pomembno – vprašanje brezposelnosti ali vprašanje neenakosti. Spodaj je nekaj ključnih odzivov.
Paul Krugman navaja naraščajoče razlike v prerazdelitvi dohodkov, ki so po njegovem glavni razlog za relativni upad dohodkov srednjega razreda ter s tem tudi za upad povpraševanja:
First, in sheer quantitative terms, rising inequality is what Joe Biden would call a Big Something Deal. Take the Piketty-Saez data on income shares; these show that the share of the bottom 90 percent in income excluding capital gains fell from 54.7 percent in 2000 to 50.4 percent in 2012. This means that the income of the bottom 90 is about 8 percent lower than it would have been if inequality had remained stable. Meanwhile, estimates of the output gap — the extent to which our economy is operating below capacity — are generally less than 6 percent. So in raw numerical terms, rising inequality has done more than the slump to depress middle-class incomes.
Jared Bernstein, svetovalec predsednika Obame v prvem mandatu, je v odličnem preglednem članku šel korak naprej in naredil neposredno povezavo med padajočimi dohodki srednjega razreda, povečano neenakostjo ter finančno krizo in gospodarsko recesijo. Stagnacija dohodkov ameriškega srednjega razreda je bila ključna za manjše agregatno povpraševanje, in to luknjo je v obdobju 2001-2007 nadomestil kreditni bum, ki je omogočil najemanje kreditov tudi revnim, kar je poganjalo agregatno povpraševanje ter seveda tudi nepremičninski in posledično tudi finančni balon.
But—and this is perhaps the most interesting finding of this report—what if the credit bubble itself is associated with inequality? If that connection is convincingly made, given its impact on the deepest recession since the Great Depression—a recession that we are still climbing out of—it would be a strong indictment of the role of inequality in slower growth. There is circumstantial evidence to support this connection between inequality, financial instability, and credit bubbles. There is no smoking gun, but recent work, both theoretical and empirical, reveals potential linkages between high levels of inequality that appear to have interacted with underregulated financial markets, contributing to overleveraging, the housing bubble, the Great Recession, and its aftermath.
Bernstein zato predlaga vladi fokus na politiko zaposlovanja, dvig minimalne plače in povečano vlogo sindikatov, ki bi zaščitili plače zaposlenih v najnižjih dohodkovnih razredih:
In that regard, the high level of inequality that we have today requires a policy response leading to a more equitable and inclusive economy. Full employment is especially important, and given the persistence of weak labor markets since 2000—very much predating the last recession—achieving full employment may require public-sector job creation, either directly through public infrastructure projects or indirectly through public subsidies for private jobs. Incentives such as greater union representation, increased minimum wages, a solid safety net, progressive taxation, and sectorial policies that lift productive sectors such as manufacturing can help raise the relative incomes of middle- and low-wage workers.
Meni se v tej debati glede ciljev in ukrepov ekonomske politike zdi ključen razmislek Richarda Reevesa v blogu na Brookings Institution. Kaj je cilj ekonomske politike – zmanjšanje neenakosti ali povečanje socialne mobilnosti (prvo namreč povzroča tudi drugo)? Če je cilj prvo, bo povišanje minimalne plače sicer dvignilo dohodke tistim v spodnjih razredih, ne bo pa zmanjšalo neenakosti. Za zmanjšanje neenakosti je treba povečati davke na dohodek in povečane prihodke v obliki socialnih transferjev nameniti revnejšim.
Če je cilj drugo, pa je najbolj smiselno povečane prihodke od višjih davkov na dohodke preusmeriti v javni šolski sistem (predšolski programi, povečanje plač učiteljev, subvencije za vpis na kolidže itd.), kar izboljšalo enakih možnosti dostopa do kvalitetnega izobraževanja in s tem posledično vplivalo tudi na večjo socialno mobilnost ljudi. To, kar je bil nekoč ameriški moto – ameriške sanje: uspeh in vzpon po družbeni lestvici, ki se lahko uresničita vsakomur, ki ima znanje in je pripravljen trdo delati za svoj uspeh. Zasledovanje cilja enakopravnih možnosti je moralno utemeljeno iz vidika liberalnih idej svobode in enakosti, na čemer naj bi temeljila ideja ameriškega družbenega reda.
But as Obama noted, American tolerance of inequality has historically rested upon an assumption of shared opportunity. The trouble is, America is now not very equal in terms of opportunity, either.
Scholars are wrestling with the question of how income inequality and intergenerational mobility are related to each other. Intuitively, it seems harder to climb a ladder when the rungs are farther apart. So inequality may cause immobility, in a relationship popularized by the economist Alan Krueger as a “Great Gatsby Curve.” But it is not a straightforward relationship. For one thing, there are some nations with similar rates of inequality to the United States, but much higher rates of mobility, such as Canada and Australia.
Meanwhile, in other nations with low rates of social mobility, such as Italy, greater government redistribution softens the blow. The children of the poor may end up poor, but their poverty is less biting than in the United States. And of course there are some countries that are both equal and enjoy mobility, such as those in Scandinavia.
Inequality and immobility are a toxic combination regardless. An unequal, immobile society will mutate into a stratified one with sharply separated classes, generation after generation.
In his speech, Obama stirred low mobility, low wages and high inequality together into a political goulash of “an economy that works for all Americans.” That’s fine for political positioning. But when it comes to policy, choices have to be made.
A higher minimum wage will raise incomes among low-income workers but will do little to reduce inequality, since the poorest don’t work—and the incomes of the top 1%, where the real inequality action is, will be unaffected.
If the goal is to address income inequality seriously, the solution is to tax the richest more and put that revenue into tax credits and welfare benefits. Doing so will even out incomes but will likely do little to alter the distribution of opportunities.
If we want to tackle intergenerational mobility, that money would be far better spent on parenting programs, pre-K schemes, higher salaries to lure talented teachers to tough schools, greater subsidies for smart, poor children going to college and tighter regulation of internships. None of which will influence short-run income inequality one jot.
Obama’s rhetoric leaned more toward boosting social mobility. But his policy prescriptions tilted more toward addressing inequality and wage levels. Which does he really want? He might of course say both. But it’s not realistic to imagine we can become Denmark. The real choice is to try and recover the notion of an open society in the American Dream, currently flourishing in Canada, or accept the slow ossification of the class divide and do a better job of compensating the poor for their increasingly inherited poverty.
If we give up on the hope of improving social mobility, the moral claims of European-style egalitarianism will become harder to resist. A large gap between rich and poor is one thing when there’s plenty of movement between the two, but quite another when affluence and poverty are inherited.
There is a moral justification for a society with high inequality offset by high mobility, grounded in liberal ideas of freedom and fairness. And there is a moral justification for a society with low mobility, softened by low inequality, based on left-of-center egalitarian ideals. But there is no moral justification for a society with a large gap between rich and poor, and little movement between the two. That’s the toxic combination we’re suffering from right now.
Prava politika pa mora s svojimi ukrepi zajeti oboje – srednjeročno zmanjšanje neenakosti (kar bo nenazadnje tudi stabiliziralo agregatno povpraševanje) ter povečanje socialne mobilnosti, kar bo dolgoročno omogočalo bolj učinkovito izrabo resursov celotne populacije ter s tem tudi višjo dolgoročno rast.
Mah…in potem si poslušaš tole in ostaneš brez misli 🙂 http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=R180uqn2OKs&desktop_uri=%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DR180uqn2OKs
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Odličen prispevek. V resnici je problem neeenakosti in nemobilnosti ključen. To, da se je prebil v “mainstream” tako v tujini kot tudi pri nekaterih naših neoliberalcih je izjemno dragoceno. Pojavlja se vprašanje, kaj pa je namen gospodarske dejavnosti človeštva? Je razvoj gospodarstva vrednota sama po sebi ali ima primaren socialen, družben cilj, tj. boljše življenje večine in ne samo peščice. Danes bi k temu lahko dodali še okoljsko vzdržno trajnostno gospodarjenje. Spomnim se TV oddaje, ki je govorila o tem (žal se ne spomnim vira), ki je omenila anketo na temo, kdaj so bili američani najsrečneješi. Odgovor je bil; v 50’tih letih, ko je bila neenakost najmanjša. Zgodovinsko največje stopnje neenakosti so bile pred velikim zlomom 1929, danes pa so ta razmerja še bistveno večja.
Na hipotezo, da je prav neenakost bistven primaren generator strukturnih kriz družbe, je na primerih zadnjega tisočletja najbolj celovito (po tem kar je meni znano) do sedaj odgovoril ameriški ekonomski zgodovinar Samuel Hackett Fischer v svoji knjigi The Great Wave – the price revolutions and the rhytm of history). Knjiga je izšla še pred zadnji krizo, ki jo je čudovito napovedal.
Všeč mi jeVšeč mi je