Karmen Reinhart iz dvojca Reinhart – Rogoff, katerih študijo o negativnem vplivu visokega dolga na rast so razkrinkali kot polno napak, je na Bloombergu objavila komentar, v katerem dokazuje, da Paul Krugman nima prav, ko trdi, da visok javni dolg ni nujno povezan z visoko ceno zadolževanja. In seveda, da je Krugman pozabil na razliko med nominalnimi in realnimi obrestnimi merami.

Hm, prinesite kokice in pijačo, kajti to se bo nadaljevalo.

Paul Krugman:

You might think that these data, and the relationship they show — or, actually, don’t show — should have some impact on our current debate, especially given the tendency of many players to reject modeling and appeal to what they claim are the lessons of history. Or are they claiming that this time is different?

Odgovor Reinhartove:

It’s hard to be sure, but Krugman appears to be saying — again — that there’s no reason to fear that high levels of public debt might inhibit growth. The chart shows that the U.K., in the 19th century, had both high levels of debt and low-and-stable nominal interest rates. So, the message seems to be, why worry about debt? Why bother to dig any deeper?

…

To begin with, in judging the connection between debt and growth, it’s real interest rates (nominal interest rates minus inflation) that matter. If low nominal interest rates were the ticket to economic prosperity, then the Great Depression of the 1930s was a boom. Nominal interest rates in the U.S. hovered around zero during much of that decade — while severe deflation yielded some of the highest real interest rates in U.S. history.

…

[…] in the post-1700 era covered in the chart, U.K. inflation ranged from a high of 37 percent a year to deflation of 25 percent. Ignoring this volatility in inflation and real interest rates suggests a financial El Dorado that would be the envy of modern-day central banks. Nominal long-term interest rates in those days were more stable precisely because inflation was more volatile and the price level tended to revert to the mean (in any given year, 10 percent inflation was about as likely as 10 percent deflation). Today it is hard to imagine that kind of volatility in real rates of return, recent crises notwithstanding.