Druga analiza ekonomistov IMF (Nicoletta Batini, Giovanni Callegari & Giovanni Melina, Successful Austerity in the United States, Europe and Japan, 2012), ki je pokazala, da je fiskalna konsolidacija v času recesije dvakrat bolj rizična kot v času gospodarske rasti, da postopne konsolidacije dajejo boljše učinke kot hitre šok terapije in da imajo drastične konsolidacije bolj negativen učinek na gospodarsko rast in da povečujejo javni dolg glede na BDP. Torej natanko tisto, kar tudi sam že nekaj let ponavljam: drastično vladno varčevanje v času krize krizo samo poglablja in še povečuje breme javnega dolga; fiskalne konsolidacije se delajo v dobrih časih in postopoma.

Kratek povzetek ugotovitev:

With the U.S., Europe’s and Japan’s public debt at historic levels, concerns are rising over the growth impact of needed fiscal adjustment. The severe recession, the significant capital interventions in the financial markets and the fiscal stimulus measures have pushed up the joint public debt to levels not seen since the end of World War II. Reducing the public debt ratio to more comfortable levels would require a large and sustained adjustment that could most likely weaken aggregate demand. In the United States and Japan, the conventional monetary policy support to fiscal consolidation is limited by the fact that interest rates are near their effective floor, while everywhere population aging and currently low trend growth provide little room to absorb falling demand. As most of the advanced countries are called to adjust, external demand will provide very little support to U.S., Europe’s and Japan’s growth prospects.

On the other hand, consolidation cannot be postponed indefinitely. …

Thus, if consolidations are delayed there is a real risk of debt downgrades or defaults. But frontloading consolidation risks bringing recoveries to a halt, hindering the same fiscal adjustment or making it too costly in terms of jobs and output. One immediate question then is: what is the pace of fiscal consolidation in the United States, the euro area and Japan that would achieve maximum adjustment given low growth, while preserving the recovery?

The main findings from the analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. Fiscal expenditure multipliers are significantly larger in downturns than in upturns;
2. While it is plausible to conjecture that confidence effects have been at play in our sample of consolidations, during downturns they do not seem to have ever been strong enough to make the consolidations expansionary at least in the short run;
3. Expenditure multipliers (where expenditure is defined as public consumption and investment only) are significantly larger than tax multipliers (where tax is defined as tax minus transfers) in downturns;
4. Monetary policy does not seem to have a strong cushioning effect on economic activity against fiscal withdrawals implemented during downturns—possibly reflecting the fact that during the actual downturns experienced by the countries of our sample, over our estimation horizon, interest rates may not have been cut sufficiently (or cut sufficiently fast) to counteract the drop in output that accompanied the episodes of fiscal consolidation.
5. The weak cushioning effect of monetary policy may also be due to the fact that some of the downturns in our sample might actually be induced by the monetary authorities in an effort to lower inflation;
6. The probability that a fiscal consolidation initiated in a downturn deepens or extends the downturn is almost twice as large as the probability that a consolidation started in an upturn triggers a downturn;
7. “Strong” (defined as 2 standard deviation fiscal shocks) consolidations are 20 percent more likely to trigger or extend downturns than “mild” (defined as 1 standard deviation fiscal shocks) consolidations. In other words, the same fiscal adjustment is less recessionary if made via an extended adjustment as opposed to a more abrupt one;
8. The exact size of the 1-year cumulative fiscal multiplier is country-, time-, and circumstance-specific, with ranges in our sample countries (in downturns) between 1.6 and 2.6 for expenditure shocks, and 0.16 and 0.35 for tax shocks.
9. The peak effect on output of fiscal consolidations is within the first year from the shock.
10. Frontloaded consolidations tend to be more contractionary and, hence, delay the reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio relative to smoother consolidations.

The key policy implications from the analysis are thus:

• Implementing fiscal consolidations during periods of positive output growth reduces significantly the impact on output;

• If consolidations need to be implemented during downturns (for instance, to regain market confidence), they should prioritize increases in net taxes (defined as taxes minus transfers);

• If consolidations have to occur during downturns and prioritize cuts in public consumption and investment, they should be smooth and gradual and be accompanied by increases in net taxes. When the fiscal adjustment relies more heavily on net tax increases than on expenditure cuts, and is gradual, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls by more, while affecting output less adversely;

• Monetary policy should be used more proactively to mitigate the output costs of consolidations.

Vir: Batini et al, Successful Austerity in the United States, Europe and Japan, IMF, 2012