Pok kitajskega nepremičninskega in kapitalskega balona se napoveduje že nekaj časa. Dogajanje na kitajskem medbančnem trgu pa vse bolj spominja pred-implozijsko stanje v ZDA poleti 2007. Vzporednic z ameriškim dogajanjem ni mogoče spregledati. Da bi omejila napihovanje balonov in gospodarske rasti je kitajska centralna banka že lani dvignila obrestne mere, kar pa je povzročilo, da se je medbančni trg (shadow banking) začel podirati, ker so banke začele kopičiti denar oziroma državne obveznice. CDS spreadi nevarno naraščajo. Prvi finančni sklad so sicer rešili pred propadom, toda čaka že naslednji in za njim domine.
Če pride do implozije kitajskega finančnega trga, bo to imelo bistveno širše posledice na globalno gospodarstvo, kot ga je imela ameriška finančna kriza. Gospodarska razmerja, trgovinski in kapitalski tokovi, kot smo jih poznali zadnjih 15 let se utegnejo povsem porušiti. Seveda lahko le upamo, da bo kitaksji centralni banki in vladi uspelo spustiti zrak iz balonov, brez da bi zamajali svetovno gospodarstvo.
The spread between the two-year sovereign yield and the similar-maturity interest-rate swap, a gauge of financial stress, reached 121 basis points on Feb. 19, the widest in Bloomberg data going back to 2007. Two days later, the cost to lock in the three-month Shanghai interbank offered rate for one year reached an eight-month high of 94 basis points over similar contracts based on repurchase agreements, which are considered safer because they involve government securities as collateral.
Billionaire investors George Soros and Bill Gross have drawn parallels between the situation in China now and that in the U.S. before the 2008 financial crisis, when traders gauged lending appetite by monitoring the difference between the London Interbank Borrowing Rate and the overnight indexed swap. Premier Li Keqiang’sefforts to curb leverage in the world’s second-largest economy by driving up borrowing costs need to be handled carefully to avoid wrecking confidence in the financial system, according to Nomura Holdings Inc.
“What I do see are increasing parallels between China and the U.S. in the run-up to the global financial crisis,” said Patrick Perret-Green, a London-based strategist at Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. “Shibor-repo is similar to Libor-OIS. Shadow banking is subprime. Credit spreads are widening as they did in 2007. Money growth is softening as tightening bites.”
China averted its first trust default in at least a decade in January as investors in a 3 billion yuan high-yield product sold by China Credit Trust Co. to fund a coal miner that collapsed were bailed out days before it came due. A similar product created by Jilin Province Trust Co. is also missing payments, Shanghai Securities News reported.
In a sign of default concern, the premium for five-year AA rated corporate notes over the sovereign widened to 337 basis points on Feb. 12, the most in two years. At least a third of China’s 200,000 steel-trading firms will collapse because of the credit crisis, the official Xinhua news agency said Feb. 7, citing industry estimates.
The slowdown may fuel bank bad loans, which surged 28.5 billion yuan in the final quarter of 2013 to 592 billion yuan, the highest since September 2008, according to China Banking Regulatory Commission data.