Kot kaže zadnje poročilo Evropske komisije (In-Depth Review for Slovenia, IDR Slovenia), objavljeno prejšnji teden, je situacija v slovenskih bankah še slabša, kot je razvidno iz poročil Banke Slovenije (Poročila o finančni stabilnosti). Banka Slovenije namreč poroča, da je obseg slabih kreditov v slovenskih bankah konec 2012 zrasel na 14.4% (kot delež razvrščene aktive), konec januarja 2013 pa na 14.6%, medtem ko IDR poročilo EK za tri največje banke v domačem lastništvu, ki imajo skupaj 50% tržni delež (NLB, NKBM in Abanka), navaja delež slabih kreditov konec 2012 med 18% (Abanka) in 28% (NLB) (kot delež vseh kreditov).
Vir: IDR Slovenia
Razlika med obema je v tem, da je osnova, s katero BS primerja delež slabih terjatev (razvrščena aktiva), širša od tiste, ki je relevantna – to je celoten obseg kreditov. Zato je relevantni delež slabih kreditov dejansko večji.
IDR poročilo je zato precej neprizanesljivo do slovenskih oblasti (vlade in BS) in priporoča (zahteva):
- tehnično in vsebinsko profesionalno opravljeno sanacijo bank,
- privatizacijo bank, da bi banke dobile boljše upravljanje in da bi se pritisk na javne finance zmanjšal,
- izdelavo in javno objavo stres testov, ki jih naj naredijo tuji konzultanti,
- boljšo regulacijo bančnega sistema s strani bolj aktivnega regulatorja.
Ta zadnja priporočila kažejo na precejšnjo kritiko dosedanjega ravnanja BS (neaktivnost glede regulacije bančnega sistema, pomanjkanje stres testov itd.) kot tudi vlade zaradi njene lastniške vloge v bankah.
Da se ne bo kaj izgubilo s prevodom, navajam štiri glavna priporočila EK v originalu (zanimive odseke sem podčrtal):
The government has accelerated its policy response to the banking sector’s problems since May 2012, but efficient implementation will require a sound strategy and patient work on important technical details. As assessed in the in-depth section, current policies include the establishment of (i) a range of tools including an asset management company to carve problematic legacy assets out of banks’ balance sheets, (ii) further state recapitalisations prompted by regulatory requirements and (iii) an upgrade to the legal framework for banking and bank supervision. As Slovenia moves into the implementation phase, strategic and technical questions remain. Efficient implementation will be challenging and technical expertise will be key.
To regain credibility and stabilise the financial sector, a new, independent and transparent assessment could usefully form the basis for a comprehensive strategy. The strategic imperatives are regaining credibility and market access, improving banks’ governance and profitability, and right-sizing and strengthening banks’ balance sheets, while minimising fiscal cost and risk. A new third-party asset quality review and a new thorough stress test are needed to quantify the challenges and ensure that the strategy, the overall fiscal envelope and the selection of tools are appropriate. These assessments would ideally be conducted by internationally recognised consultants under the guidance of a steering committee comprising the relevant international financial institutions and the Slovenian authorities. The asset quality review and stress test should cover the entire banking system (with the systemically relevant banks constituting an absolute minimum) and would inform a system-wide viability assessment. Publishing the approaches used, with underlying assumptions and main findings, would help to maximise credibility. Based on these findings, a strategy could usefully articulate how the fiscal resources can be mobilised most efficiently in order to constitute a clear and quantified roadmap. The fresh assessment can also provide information on legacy portfolios that could help in selecting the most efficient legal tools, especially if a mixed approach is required to cater for the diverse nature of legacy portfolios.
Strengthened balance sheets alone are not sufficient to safeguard the soundness of the banks concerned; privatisation would help improve corporate governance of these banks and could potentially also provide fresh capital. Privatisation would help to address manifest corporate governance and credibility deficiencies and would reduce implicit fiscal liabilities and sovereign-banking contagion in the future. The former coalition agreement on retaining a blocking minority in banks and insurance companies was a major obstacle in this respect, while the 13 March 2013 coalition agreement is silent on bank privatisation. As an interim measure while the bank equity market remains depressed, it is of the utmost importance that governance of state-owned banks is improved substantially and that a framework to ensure that banks operate at arm’s length is put in place.
Continued strengthening of the supervisory framework and, where necessary, promptly using the new powers for supervisory action are vital. A stronger, more active supervisor can guide banks through the challenging period ahead, involving dealing with legacy assets, deleveraging, shoring up capital positions, improving management and internal processes and developing sustainable business models. Strict provisioning requirements are essential. A supervisor with a strong reputation, underpinned by strong powers will also lend credibility vis-à-vis investors. Finally, it will safeguard against a repeat of asset price bubbles and reckless leveraging-up of firms and banks.